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ABSTRACT 
 
WTLS (Wireless Transport Layer Security) is the security protocol designed for 
WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) protocol stack. Negotiation of the security 
parameters and authentication of the peers require using public key cryptosystems. 
Public key operations are generally slow. Thus, use of these cryptosystems in resource 
constrained handheld devices becomes a significant problem. Server (WAP Gateway)  
waiting time and handshake data transmission time may also be bottlenecks that occur 
during the WTLS handshake. 
 
In this study, WTLS Handshake Protocol is implemented using C++ and 
performance measurements are done using Nokia 7650 as client and open source 
Kannel gateway as the WAP Gateway. GSM CSD (Global System for Mobile 
Communication - Circuit Switched Data) data bearer with 9600 bps data rate has been 
used during the tests. Networking time has also been measured using GPRS bearer. 
Mutual authenticated and Server Authenticated WTLS full handshake performance with 
RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) and ECDH_ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) key exchange suites has been compared for 
three different categories. Each category contains four groups: three of these groups use 
certificates with ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) curve parameters and the fourth 
group uses RSA certificates. All of the groups in each category are assumed to provide 
the same level of security. Three groups of ECC certificates are composed of prime, 
Koblitz and random curve parameters.  
 
Client and server processing times have been measured for each handshake 
message of the test cases. These values have been used to analyze the processing load of 
the corresponding key exchange suite, overall handshake time and server queue delay. 
 
Server has been modeled as an M/G/1 queue and the average waiting time in the 
server queue has been modeled based on the well-known Pollaczek-Khincin (P-K) 
formula. Queue delay model has been implemented in Matlab 6.0 and queue delay 
characteristics of the considered test cases have been analyzed using the measured 
server processing times. 
 
Data transmission time model includes two components. The first component is 
the amount of time necessary to transmit the measured size of data with specified 
channel transmission rate.   The second component is the traversal delay of the network 
that is added to the data transmission time regardless of how much data is sent. 
 
Simulation results show that ECC has better processing time performance than 
RSA. Server queue delay does not seem to be bottleneck for mutual authenticated 
WTLS handshake us ing ECC certificates with prime curve  parameters. Server 
authenticated WTLS handshake using any of the three ECC certificate types also has a 
good queue delay characteristic. However, there exists a practical upper limit of 
handshake requests per second for other key exchange suites. Traversal delay of the 
network is much more effective on the overall handshake time when using GSM CSD 
or GPRS bearer. 
 
v 
ÖZET 
 
WTLS (Kablosuz Tasima Katmani Güvenligi – Wireless Transport Layer 
Security), WAP(Kablosuz Uygulama Protokolü – Wireless Application Protocol) 
protokol yigini için tasarlanmis güvenlik protokolüdür. Güvenlik parametreleri üzerinde 
anlasilabilmesi ve kimlik dogrulamasinin yapilabilmesi için açik anahtar kripto 
sistemlerinin kullanilmasi gerekmektedir. Açik anahtar islemleri genel olarak yavastir 
ve bu islemlerin kisitli kaynaklari olan mobil el cihazlarinda yürütülmesi daha büyük bir 
problem olarak karsimiza çikmaktadir. Sunucu (WAP Aggeçidi) bekleme süresi ve el 
sikisma verisinin gönderilmesi için gerekli süre de WTLS el sikisma protokolü için bir 
darbogaz olusturabilir. 
 
Bu çalismada WTLS El Sikisma Protokolü, C++ programlama dili ile 
gerçeklenmistir. Istemci ola rak Nokia 7650 cep telefonu, WAP Aggeçidi olarak da açik 
kaynak kodlu Kannel kullanilmistir. Testler sirasinda, 9600 bps iletim hizina sahip 
GSM CSD tasiyicisi kullanilmistir. Veri iletim süresi ayrica GPRS tasiyici için de 
ölçülmüstür. Karsilikli-Dogrulanmis ve Sunucu-Dogrulanmis WTLS tam el sikisma 
performansi, RSA ve ECDH_ECDSA anahtar degisim takimlari için üç kategori altinda 
karsilastirilmistir. Her kategoride dört grup bulunmaktadir. Gruplardan üç tanesi, ECC 
egri parametrelerine sahip sertifikalar, dördüncü grup ise RSA sertifikalarindan 
olusmaktadir. Bir kategori içindeki tüm gruplarin esit seviyede güvenlik sagladigi kabul 
edilmektedir. Ele alinan üç ECC grubu, asal, Koblitz ve rasgele egri parametrelerine 
sahiptir. 
 
Tüm test durumlari için istemci ve sunucu islem süreleri, her bir el sikisma mesaji 
için ölçülmüstür. Ölçülen degerler, ele alinan anahtar degistirme takimi için islem 
süresini, el sikisma süresini ve sunucu kuyruk bekleme süresini degerlendirmek 
amaciyla kullanilmistir. 
 
Sunucu, M/G/1 kuyruk yapisinda varsayilmistir ve sunucu kuyrugunda ortalama 
bekleme süresi Pollaczek-Khincin (P-K) formülüne dayali olarak modellenmistir. 
Kuyruk bekleme süresi için ortaya koyulan model, Matlab 6.0 ortaminda 
gerçeklenmistir ve ölçülen sunucu islem süreleri kullanilarak test durumlarinin kuyrukta 
bekleme karakteristikleri analiz edilmistir. 
 
Veri iletim süresi modeli, testler sirasinda tespit edilen veri boyutunun mevcut 
veri iletim hiziyla gönderilmesi için gerekli sürenin yaninda veri boyutundan bagimsiz 
olarak iletim süresine eklenen agdan geçis süresini de göz önünde bulundurmaktadir. 
 
Simülasyon sonuçlari, ECC islem süresi performansinin RSA’dan daha iyi 
oldugunu göstermistir. Sunucu kuyrugunda bekleme süresinin asal egriler için ihmal 
edilebilecek mertebede olmasina karsin diger alternatiflerde saniyedeki el sikisma istegi 
sayisinin pratik bir üst sinirinin oldugu görülmüstür. GSM CSD veya GPRS tasiyicisi 
kullanilmasi durumunda veri iletim süresi, iletim hizindan daha çok agdan geçis süresi 
tarafindan belirlenmektedir. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
WTLS (Wireless Transport Layer Security) is the security protocol designed for 
WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) protocol stack. Negotiation of the security 
parameters and authentication of the peers require using public key cryptosystems. 
Public key operations are generally slow. Thus, use of these cryptosystems in resource 
constrained handheld devices becomes a significant problem. Server (WAP Gateway)  
waiting time and handshake data transmission time may also be bottlenecks that occur 
during the WTLS handshake. 
 
In this study, WTLS Handshake Protocol is implemented using C++ and 
performance measurements are done using Nokia 7650 as client and open source 
Kannel gateway as the WAP Gateway. GSM CSD (Global System for Mobile 
Communication - Circuit Switched Data) data bearer with 9600 bps data rate has been 
used during the tests. Networking time has also been measured using GPRS bearer. 
Mutual authenticated and Server Authenticated WTLS full handshake performance with 
RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) and ECDH_ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) key exchange suites has been compared for 
three different categories. Each category contains four groups: three of these groups use 
certificates with ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) curve parameters and the fourth 
group uses RSA certificates. All of the groups in each category are assumed to provide 
the same level of security. Three groups of ECC certificates are composed of prime, 
Koblitz and random curve parameters.  
 
Client and server processing times have been measured for each handshake 
message of the test cases. These values have been used to analyze the processing load of 
the corresponding key exchange suite, overall handshake time and server queue delay. 
 
Server has been modeled as an M/G/1 queue and the average waiting time in the 
server queue has been modeled based on the well-known Pollaczek-Khincin (P-K) 
formula. Queue delay model has been implemented in Matlab 6.0 and queue delay 
characteristics of the considered test cases have been analyzed using the measured 
server processing times. 
 
Data transmission time model includes two components. The first component is 
the amount of time necessary to transmit the measured size of data with specified 
channel transmission rate.   The second component is the traversal delay of the network 
that is added to the data transmission time regardless of how much data is sent. 
 
Simulation results show that ECC has better processing time performance than 
RSA. Server queue delay does not seem to be bottleneck for mutual authenticated 
WTLS handshake us ing ECC certificates with prime curve  parameters. Server 
authenticated WTLS handshake using any of the three ECC certificate types also has a 
good queue delay characteristic. However, there exists a practical upper limit of 
handshake requests per second for other key exchange suites. Traversal delay of the 
network is much more effective on the overall handshake time when using GSM CSD 
or GPRS bearer. 
 
v 
ÖZET 
 
WTLS (Kablosuz Tasima Katmani Güvenligi – Wireless Transport Layer 
Security), WAP(Kablosuz Uygulama Protokolü – Wireless Application Protocol) 
protokol yigini için tasarlanmis güvenlik protokolüdür. Güvenlik parametreleri üzerinde 
anlasilabilmesi ve kimlik dogrulamasinin yapilabilmesi için açik anahtar kripto 
sistemlerinin kullanilmasi gerekmektedir. Açik anahtar islemleri genel olarak yavastir 
ve bu islemlerin kisitli kaynaklari olan mobil el cihazlarinda yürütülmesi daha büyük bir 
problem olarak karsimiza çikmaktadir. Sunucu (WAP Aggeçidi) bekleme süresi ve el 
sikisma verisinin gönderilmesi için gerekli süre de WTLS el sikisma protokolü için bir 
darbogaz olusturabilir. 
 
Bu çalismada WTLS El Sikisma Protokolü, C++ programlama dili ile 
gerçeklenmistir. Istemci ola rak Nokia 7650 cep telefonu, WAP Aggeçidi olarak da açik 
kaynak kodlu Kannel kullanilmistir. Testler sirasinda, 9600 bps iletim hizina sahip 
GSM CSD tasiyicisi kullanilmistir. Veri iletim süresi ayrica GPRS tasiyici için de 
ölçülmüstür. Karsilikli-Dogrulanmis ve Sunucu-Dogrulanmis WTLS tam el sikisma 
performansi, RSA ve ECDH_ECDSA anahtar degisim takimlari için üç kategori altinda 
karsilastirilmistir. Her kategoride dört grup bulunmaktadir. Gruplardan üç tanesi, ECC 
egri parametrelerine sahip sertifikalar, dördüncü grup ise RSA sertifikalarindan 
olusmaktadir. Bir kategori içindeki tüm gruplarin esit seviyede güvenlik sagladigi kabul 
edilmektedir. Ele alinan üç ECC grubu, asal, Koblitz ve rasgele egri parametrelerine 
sahiptir. 
 
Tüm test durumlari için istemci ve sunucu islem süreleri, her bir el sikisma mesaji 
için ölçülmüstür. Ölçülen degerler, ele alinan anahtar degistirme takimi için islem 
süresini, el sikisma süresini ve sunucu kuyruk bekleme süresini degerlendirmek 
amaciyla kullanilmistir. 
 
Sunucu, M/G/1 kuyruk yapisinda varsayilmistir ve sunucu kuyrugunda ortalama 
bekleme süresi Pollaczek-Khincin (P-K) formülüne dayali olarak modellenmistir. 
Kuyruk bekleme süresi için ortaya koyulan model, Matlab 6.0 ortaminda 
gerçeklenmistir ve ölçülen sunucu islem süreleri kullanilarak test durumlarinin kuyrukta 
bekleme karakteristikleri analiz edilmistir. 
 
Veri iletim süresi modeli, testler sirasinda tespit edilen veri boyutunun mevcut 
veri iletim hiziyla gönderilmesi için gerekli sürenin yaninda veri boyutundan bagimsiz 
olarak iletim süresine eklenen agdan geçis süresini de göz önünde bulundurmaktadir. 
 
Simülasyon sonuçlari, ECC islem süresi performansinin RSA’dan daha iyi 
oldugunu göstermistir. Sunucu kuyrugunda bekleme süresinin asal egriler için ihmal 
edilebilecek mertebede olmasina karsin diger alternatiflerde saniyedeki el sikisma istegi 
sayisinin pratik bir üst sinirinin oldugu görülmüstür. GSM CSD veya GPRS tasiyicisi 
kullanilmasi durumunda veri iletim süresi, iletim hizindan daha çok agdan geçis süresi 
tarafindan belirlenmektedir. 
vi 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Emerging growth of the mobility requirements for today’s daily life has brought 
up an increasing demand on the use of WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) [1] 
applications. WAP is an enabling techno logy for mobile Internet access using resource 
constrained handheld devices. WAP standards have been developed by an international 
industry-wide organization WAP Forum. However, WAP Forum no longer exists as an 
independent organization since June 2002. The WAP Forum has consolidated into the 
Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) and the specification work continues within OMA since 
2002. Latest version announced is WAP 2.0 but most handheld devices still support the 
preceding version WAP 1.2. 
 
The number of mobile handheld devices accessing Internet increased rapidly for 
the last four years. Percentage of wireless Internet users was 16% of the overall Internet 
users by the year 2001, where it is 41.5% for year 2004 and expected to be 60% by the 
year 2007 according to the recent researches in [2] and [3]. Global m-commerce 
revenue was approximately 3 billion USD for year 2001, where it is predicted to be 19 
billion USD by the year 2005 as stated in [4]. Therefore, security of WAP transactions 
becomes one of the biggest security concerns for the future Internet use. Considering 
today’s available value-added WAP services like Mobile Internet Banking, M-
commerce, etc., we can say that security requirements of WAP applications are not that 
different from the traditional wired Internet.  
 
WTLS (Wireless Transport Layer Security) [5] is the security protocol designed 
for WAP protocol stack. WTLS is built on the Internet standard TLS v1.0 [6] which is 
based on the SSL v3.0 [7] protocol developed by Netscape Corp. WTLS operates 
between the mobile client and the server, which is also called as WAP Gateway. It 
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addresses confidentiality, integrity and authentication of the information flow between 
the mobile client and the server. WAP gateway retrieves the requested WAP content 
from the external web servers using the regular TCP/IP protocol suite and sends the 
content back to the client. It is obvious that there is no end-to-end security means 
between the client and the content server for WAP applications. Although WTLS is 
used to secure the communication between WAP Gateway and client, there is no 
guarantee that the WAP Gateway communicates over SSL with the content server. 
Network participant s of a typical WAP access are given in Figure 1.1. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Network participants of a typical WAP access 
 
WTLS provides all the security related parameters to the upper layer protocols. 
WTLS Handshake Protocol is used to negotiate on the cryptographic algorithms to be 
used, exchange secret keys and digital certificates.  
 
Although there are anonymous key exchange suites that are offered by the WTLS 
standard [5], they are not considered secure. Neither client nor the server is 
authenticated at the anonymous key exchange suites. WTLS uses digital certificates for 
authentication of the peers and authenticated key exchange between them. Digital 
certificates are issued by trusted Certification Authorities (CA). They contain identity 
information of the peer together with the public key to be used during the handshake. 
Authentication of the peer requires verification of its certificate using the public key 
retrieved from the CA certificate. Handshake mechanism varies depending on the 
cryptosystem used. 
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Public key cryptosystems are used to verify the certificates and exchange secret 
keys between the peers. Public key cryptosystem operations are generally slow and the 
processing time significantly increases as the larger key sizes are used. Public key 
cryptosystems key sizes offered by the WTLS standard are not strong enough to meet 
today’s WAP applications’ security requirements. Considering the low processing 
power of the handheld devices, it may be reasonable to restrict the key sizes. However, 
WAP Forum does not seem to stand on a serious cryptographic research while 
recommending the key sizes at the WTLS standard [5]. Therefore, a performance 
evaluation of the WTLS Handshake Protocol for different key exchange suites is 
valuable. Especially a feasibility study on the use of stronger key sizes that has not been 
offered by the standard yet will put a light on the future progress of the WTLS standard. 
 
In this thesis work, performance evaluation of the WTLS Handshake Protocol has 
been performed. Performance model considers the client and server processing times, 
server queue delay and the data transmission time over the channel as bottleneck 
candidates of the handshake operation. Processing times and data transmission times 
have been measured by performing the tests over a real GSM service provider. Test 
client is a Nokia 7650 phone with Symbian operating system. Symbian OS is widely 
used at today’s smart phones. It has a flexible programming interface that supports 
many programming languages like C/C++, Java, etc. Crypto primitives and the WTLS 
Handshake Protocol have been implemented in C++. Queue delay performance was 
modeled analytically. However, measured server processing times have been used in 
that analytical model to analyze the effects of server waiting time. WTLS handshake 
protocol simulations have been performed over the GSM CSD data bearer, and another 
performance test methodology has been followed to predict the data transmission time 
characteristics for GPRS bearer. Timing measurements have been used together with 
the performance model to analyze the effects of the bottleneck candidates on the WTLS 
handshake protocol. 
 
In Section 2, background information on WAP protocol and public key 
cryptography is given. Previous works on WTLS performance evaluation are also 
summarized in this section. Section 3 dwells upon the proposed performance model. 
Performance data gathered from implementation results are evaluated in Section 4. 
Section 5 gives the conclusions and the future work. 
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2. WAP BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
Before going into details of the WTLS handshake protocol, it is worth mentioning 
how clients access to WAP content and what are the WAP protocol stack components. 
Section 2.1 explains the basic operations when accessing WAP content. WAP protocol 
stack components are briefly defined in Section 2.2, where WTLS handshake protocol 
is considered in more detail in Section 2.4. Section 2.3 gives background information on 
public key cryptosystems that are used in the WTLS Handshake Protocol. 
Cryptographic functions which are used to compute the master secret are defined in 
Section 2.5. Discussion of previous works on WTLS/SSL performance is also given at 
the end of this chapter. 
 
2.1. WAP Access Model 
 
The most widely used WAP content access model is the one that uses mobile 
service provider’s WAP gateway. WAP content format is WML (Wireless Markup 
Language) [8] which is based on the familiar WWW (World Wide Web) content format 
HTML (HyperText Markup Language) [9]. WML is a structured content type designed 
using XML (Extensible Markup Language) [10]. WAP gateway is responsible for 
handling client requests. Clients send the WAP request to the gateway, gateway 
communicates with the content provider and gets the HTML reply then applying the 
necessary binary WML format conversion the gateway sends the WAP content to the 
client. Generally the WAP gateway has two main functionalities as stated in [1]. These 
are: 
 
· Protocol Gateway: Translates the WAP protocol stack to the WWW protocol 
stack ( HTTP [11]and TCP/IP) 
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· Content Encoders and Decoders: Translate WAP content to the channel 
optimized encoded format. 
 
Typical WAP access message flow between client, gateway and content provider 
is visualized in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 WAP access model 
  
2.2. WAP Protocol Stack Components 
 
WAP protocol stack is designed taking the ISO/OSI Layered Structure [12] as a 
reference. It is composed of 6 protocol layers. A brief description of each protocol layer 
is given in the following parts. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 WAP protocol stack components 
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2.2.1. Wireless Application Environment (WAE) 
 
WAE [13] layer includes all the specification about WAP application 
specification and execution especially the client side. WAE is based on both WWW and 
Mobile Telephony technologies. Its main purpose is to establish an interoperable 
environment that will allow operators, service providers and developers to build 
applications and services for mobile WAP clients. WAE has following functionalities: 
 
· WML (Wireless Markup Language): Special markup language designed for 
resource constrained hand-held WAP clients. WAP pages are presented in WML 
and microbrowsers in the WAP clients know how to render WML pages. WML 
is similar to HTML which is used to present web pages of WWW technology. 
· WMLScript [14]: A lightweight scripting language designed for WAP clients. 
WMLScript is especially useful to add client side logic to WAP browsing. 
· WTA (Wireless Telephony Application) [15]: Telephony services and 
programming interfaces. 
 
2.2.2. Wireless Session Protocol (WSP) 
 
WSP [16] provides a means for exchange of data between client and servers by 
establishing a reliable session and releasing the session in an orderly manner. General 
features of WSP are: 
 
· Establishing/releasing session between client and server 
· Capability negotiation to agree on a common level of protocol functionality 
· Exchange content between client and server 
· Suspend and resume the session 
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WSP offers two protocols one of which is connection oriented transaction service 
and the second one is connectionless services over a datagram transport service. 
 
2.2.3. Wireless Transaction Protocol (WTP) 
 
WTP [17] is the transaction protocol defined for WAP access. WTP provides the 
necessary services for browsing WAP pages; actually it serves for WAP transactions. A 
transaction for WAP is defined as the duo of request and response. WTP lays on top of 
WAP datagram service WDP (Wireless Datagram Protocol) [18] and optionally the 
security layer WTLS (Wireless Transport Layer Security) [5] if used. 
 
2.2.4. Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS) 
 
WTLS [5] is the security protocol defined for the WAP protocol stack. Use of 
WTLS is not mandatory, it is optional to enable or disable WTLS protocol. WTLS is 
based on well known Internet standard TLS v1.0 [6] (formerly known as SSL v3 [7]) 
and it is optimized for use over narrow-band communication channels. WTLS provides 
the following basic security services for WAP applications: 
 
· Authentication 
· Integrity 
· Confidentiality 
 
Section 2.4 deals with WTLS and its sub-protocols in more detail. 
 
8 
2.2.5. Wireless Datagram Protocol (WDP) 
 
WDP [18] is the transport layer protocol in the WAP architecture and it operates 
over data bearer services as GSM, CDMA etc. WDP offers a consistent service to upper 
layer protocols of WAP by communicating with different bearer services transparently. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 WDP structure 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the underlying structure of the WDP layer. The adaptation layer 
is the part of WDP that maps the WDP functions to the underlying bearer service. The 
wireless data gateway forwards the WDP packets to a WAP proxy via a tunneling 
protocol. The sub-network may be one of the networking technologies that provide 
communication between peers, like LANs (Local Area Networks) operating TCP/IP 
over Ethernet etc. [18] The WAP proxy may directly provide the content or it may 
retrieve the content from the wired Internet to send it back to the client. 
 
2.2.6. Bearers  
 
WAP protocols can operate over various bearer services which can be grouped as 
Short Message Service (SMS), circuit-switched data, and packet data. WDP protocol 
provides the means to operate transparently over different bearer services for the upper 
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layer WAP protocols. Different bearer services offer different QoS (Quality of Service), 
throughput, error rate, and delays. New bearers may be adapted to the WAP protocol 
family as the mobile market evolves and better bearer services are designed for WAP 
use. Table 2.1 gives the available bearers from WAP 1.2.1 (June 200) standard [18], 
with network and address type specification. 
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Network  Bearer type  Address type 
Any Any IPv4 
Any Any IPv6 
GSM  USSD  Any 
GSM SMS GSM_MSISDN  
ANSI-136  GUTS/R-Data  ANSI_136_MSISDN  
IS-95 CDMA  SMS IS_637_MSISDN  
IS-95 CDMA  CSD IPv4  
IS-95 CDMA  Packet Data IPv4  
ANSI-136  CSD IPv4  
ANSI-136  Packet Data  IPv4  
GSM CSD IPv4  CSD IPv4  
GSM GPRS IPv4  GPRS IPv4  
GSM USSD   USSD  IPv4 
AMPS CDPD   CDPD IPv4 
PDC CSD   CSD IPv4 
PDC  Packet Data   IPv4 
IDEN  SMS  iDEN_MSISDN  
IDEN CSD IPv4 
IDEN Packet Data IPv4 
Paging network   FLEXTM FLEX_MSISDN 
PHS    SMS PHS_MSISDN 
PHS CSD IPv4 
GSM    USSD GSM_Service_Code 
TETRA    SDS TETRA_ITSI 
TETRA    SDS TETRA_MSISDN 
TETRA  Packet Data  IPv4 
Paging Network   ReFLEXTM ReFLEX_MSIDDN 
GSM    USSD GSM_MSISDN 
Mobitex    MPAK MAN 
ANSI-136   GHOST/R_DATA GSM_MSISDN 
Table 2.1 WAP network bearer types 
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2.3. Public Key Cryptosystems  
 
Public key cryptosystems have been the most appropriate solution to some major 
security problems like integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. Main security goals 
are defined below. 
 
· Integrity: Making sure that it will be notified if the message has been 
altered since the last checkpoint. 
· Authentication: Making sure of a communicating party’s identity 
· Confidentiality: Only the intended parties can see the content of a message 
· Non-repudiation: The sender cannot claim that he/she did not send the 
message 
 
In the public key cryptosystems, each user holds a key pair. One of the keys is the 
private key, must be kept secret and only the owner can access it. The second key is the 
public key that can be accessed by any party needing it for encryption and signature 
validation.  
 
Public key cryptosystems can be used for all of the security goals mentioned 
above. Integrity, authentication and non-repudiation can be ensured by digitally signing 
the message with the private key. The recipients can verify the signature by using the 
publicly available public key of the sender. The public key cannot decrypt the message 
that it encrypted, also the private cannot easily be derived from the public key. Figure 
2.4 shows the signature issuance and signature verification models for public key 
cryptosystems in general. 
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Figure 2.4 Public key cryptosystems signature issuance and verification models 
 
Public key cryptosystems have encryption/decryption features to ensure 
confidentiality but it is not feasible to use public key cryptosystems for confidentiality 
issues directly. Symmetric algorithms are faster than public key algorithms and they are 
used for encryption/decryp tion purposes. The biggest problem of communicating 
securely via symmetric encryption is that the peers must agree on a secret key that only 
they know and no one else can capture/generate. Fortunately, public key cryptosystems 
contribute to the confidentiality by providing means of securely exchanging such secrets 
between the peers. Figure 2.5 shows the public key cryptosystems encryption and 
decryption models in general. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Public key cryptosystems encryption and decryption models 
 
RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) [19] and ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) [20] 
are the most widely used public key cryptosystems in WTLS Handshake Protocol. 
These cryptosystems and basic cryptographic operations are briefly defined in the 
following parts of this section. 
 
2.3.1. RSA Cryptosystems  
 
RSA was proposed by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman in 1977. It is based on the  
idea that factorization of large integers into their prime factors is a hard problem. Thus, 
the difficulty of obtaining the private key using the public key is the one-way function 
that has the equivalent difficulty of finding the prime factors of a large integer.  
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In RSA, public and private keys are generated as follows: 
 
· Choose two large prime numbers, p and q, compute the public modulus 
qpn ´=  
· Choose a random public key, e, where e and )1()1( -´- qp  are relatively 
prime 
· Compute the private key d as, [ ])1)(1(mod1 --= - qped  
 
Encryption mechanism 
 
The plaintext P, is thus encrypted to generate ciphertext C as follows: 
 
nPC e mod=  
 
Decryption mechanism 
 
and C is decrypted to recover the plaintext ,P, as: 
 
nCP d mod=  
 
RSA key exchange mechanism 
  
RSA key exchange is performed by using the encryption and decryption 
properties of the RSA algorithm. A premaster secret is encrypted by using the public 
key of the other communicating party and the encrypted premaster secret is sent to the 
owner of the public key. Encrypted premaster secret can only be decrypted by the owner 
of the private key that is related to the public key which was used to encrypt the 
premaster secret. After the decryption operation, both parties know the same premaster 
secret. Therefore, they can compute the master secret from this shared secret. 
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2.3.2. Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems  
 
ECC was proposed by Koblitz [20] in 1987 and by V.S. Miller [21] in 1985 
separately and it is now the strongest rival against the RSA cryptosystems because of 
several advantages. Each elliptic curve is a different cryptosystem. The security of ECC 
stems from the hardness of the ECDLP (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem). 
ECDLP is defined as below: 
 
ECDLP Definition: Given an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field qF , a point 
)( qFEP Î of order n, and a point lPQ = where 10 -££ nl , determine l. 
 
Smaller modulus values can be used in ECC to achieve the same level of security 
as compared to larger RSA modulus values. This brings the advantages of easier and 
cheaper implementations, transmitting less data. Moreover, ECC is faster as well.  
 
ECC cryptosystems use ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) [24] 
for signature issuance and signature verification. ECDSA is the elliptic curve analogue 
of the DSA [25] (Digital Signature Algorithm).  
 
ECDSA signature generation mechanism 
 
To generate the ECDSA signature of a message m, an entity Alice with domain 
parameters ),,,,,,( hnGbaFRqD = and key pair (d,Q) performs the following 
operations: 
 
1. Select a random integer k, 11 -££ nk . 
2. Compute ),( 11 yxkG =  and nxr mod1= . If 0=r  then go to step 1. 
3. Compute nk mod1- . 
4. Compute )(1 mSHAe -= . 
5. Compute ndreks mod)(1 += - . If 0=s  then go to step 1. 
6. Signature of the message m is, (r,s). 
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ECDSA signature verification mechanism 
 
To verify Alice’s ECDSA signature (r,s) of the message m, an entity Bob should 
first obtain Alice’s domain parameters ),,,,,,( hnGbaFRqD = and public key Q, and 
perform the following operations: 
 
1. Verify that r and s satisfy the condition, 1,1 -££ nsr . 
2. Compute )(1 mSHAe -= . 
3. Compute nsw mod1-= . 
4. Compute newu mod1 =  and nrwu mod2 = . 
5. Compute QuGuX 21 += . If 0=X , signature is rejected. Otherwise, 
compute nxv mod1=  where ),( 11 yxX = . 
6. Signature is accepted iff rv = . 
 
ECDH key exchange mechanism 
 
ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) [22] key exchange is performed to 
securely share a secret between two communicating parties in ECC cryptosystems. 
ECDH is the elliptic curve version of the DH (Diffie-Hellman) [23] key exchange.  
 
Suppose that Alice and Bob want to securely exchange a secret value (premaster 
secret key), and they are using ECC cryptosystems. Therefore, they will perform ECDH 
key exchange as defined below. ECDH key exchange mechanism is shown in Figure 2.6. 
 
1. Alice and Bob agree on an elliptic curve E, and a large prime number P. 
2. Alice and Bob agree on a point (x,y) on E over GF(P). 
3. Both peers separately performs: 
a. Alice secretly chooses a positive integer m, and computes 
),(*),( yxmvu = . 
b. Bob secretly chooses a positive integer n, and computes 
),(*),( yxnsr = . 
4. Both peers separately performs: 
16 
a. Alice sends (u,v) to Bob. 
b. Bob sends (r,s) to Alice. 
5. Alice and Bob computes the secret point (g,h): 
a. Alice secretly computes ),(*),( srmhg = . 
b. Bob secretly computes ),(*),( vunhg = . 
 
 
Figure 2.6 ECDH key exchange mechanism 
 
2.3.3. Cryptographic Strength Level Comparison of RSA and Elliptic 
Curve Cryptosystems  
 
Lenstra and Verheul have compared the cryptographic key sizes of RSA and ECC 
cryptosystems in [26]. Table 2.2 gives the equivalent ECC and RSA key sizes taken 
from [26], for three cryptographic strength levels considered in this study. Three 
different types of ECC curves have been considered, these are prime, Koblitz, and 
random curves. ECC curves that are used in this study, are the recommended curves by 
the US NIST (United States National Institute of Standards and Technologies) in [27]. 
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Cryptographic 
Strength Level 
 
ECC 
 
RSA 
 
1 
160 bit Prime, 163 bit Koblitz, 163 bit 
Random  
1024 bit 
 
2 
224 bit Prime, 233 bit Koblitz, 233 bit 
Random  
2048 bit 
 
Stronger 
 
3 
256 bit Prime, 283 bit Koblitz, 283 bit 
Random 
3072 bit 
Table 2.2 RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems cryptographic strength level comparison 
 
2.4. WTLS Handshake Protocol 
 
WTLS Handshake Protocol [5] is one of the four clients of the WTLS Record 
protocol [5]. The WTLS Record Protocol is a layered protocol that optionally 
compresses data, applies MAC, encryption and transmits the data. The other clients of 
the WTLS Record Layer are Change Cipher Spec Protocol, and Alert Protocol. 
 
WTLS Handshake Protocol [5] is used to allow WAP client and gateways to agree 
upon security parameters for the record layer, authenticate themselves and report error 
conditions to each other. Change Cipher Spec Protocol, Alert Protocol and Handshake 
Protocol are the sub-protocols of the WTLS Handshake protocol. Figure 2.7 gives the 
relation between the WTLS Record Protocol, WTLS Handshake Protocol and its sub-
protocols. 
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Figure 2.7 WTLS protocol components 
 
Change Cipher Spec Protocol may be used either by the client or the gateway. It 
notifies the other party that the security negotiation has been completed. The following 
messages are protected by the agreed security parameters. The first messages that will 
be protected after the Change Cipher Spec message are client finished and server 
finished messages. 
 
Alert Protocol is used to inform the peers about handshake errors. Alert messages 
convey the severity of the message and a description of the alert. Alert levels are 
specified as warning, critical and fatal in the standard [5]. Critical alert messages result 
in the immediate termination of the current connection, where the connection may 
continue in the case of other levels of alert messages. 
 
Use of WTLS for WAP sessions is optional and the peers must negotiate on the 
security parameters before starting the secure session. WTLS Handshake Protocol is the 
sub-protocol that provides the necessary security parameters to the upper layer Record 
Protocol. The WTLS Handshake Protocol’s main features are listed below: 
 
· Exchanging the client hello messages 
· Exchanging the random values 
· Exchanging the authentication information (certificates, cryptographic 
information etc.) 
· Provide means to generate a master secret from the pre-master secret and the 
previously exchanged random values 
· Providing the security parameters to the Record Protocol 
19 
 
WTLS supports RSA [19] and ECC [20] cryptosystems. If the key exchange is 
performed using RSA cryptosystems, encryption and decryption features of RSA is 
used. ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman)  [22] key exchange method is performed if 
ECC is used. The standard [5] also offers anonymous key exchange suites, DH (Diffie-
Hellman) [23], RSA_anon, and ECDH_anon. Anonymous key exchange suites do not 
authenticate any of the peers, so they are not considered as secure and not in the scope 
of this thesis work. 
 
WTLS provides authentication by means of the digital certificates. Verification of 
the digital certificates requires public-key operations. RSA has its own verification 
feature. ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) [24] is used for signature 
verification purposes if ECC is to be used. 
 
WTLS Handshake Protocol may be performed in three basic type, these are Full 
Handshake, Abbreviated Handshake and Optimized Handshake. 
 
2.4.1. Full Handshake 
 
There exist three different types of WTLF Full Handshake. These are Mutual 
Authenticated, Server Authenticated and Anonymous WTLS Full Handshake. 
Anonymous key exchange suites are not secure because neither the client nor the server 
is authenticated. Also, it is possible to perform MIM (Man In the Middle) attacks if 
anonymous key exchange suites are used. Mutual Authenticated WTLS Full Handshake 
and Server Authenticated WTLS Full Handshake will be considered in this section. 
 
2.4.1.1. Mutual Authenticated WTLS Full Handshake 
 
Mutual Authenticated WTLS Full Handshake requires both the client and the 
server have a valid certificate appropriate to the selected key exchange suite. These 
digital certificates are used through the key exchange process to compute the premaster 
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secret. RSA or ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites can be used in mutual authenticated 
WTLS full handshake. 
 
The first handshake message to be sent by the client is the client hello message. 
Critical information that the client hello message includes are the client’s random value, 
key exchange suites supported by the client with the client’s first preference first, list of 
trusted certificates known by the client, and list of the cryptographic options supported 
by the client. Version of the WTLS protocol, session id, compression methods, and key 
refresh period are also presented in the client hello message. After sending the client 
hello message, the client waits for the server hello message. 
 
If the server can not find an acceptable set of algorithms after receiving the client 
hello message, it sends a handshake failure alert. Otherwise, the server responds with 
the server hello message. Server hello message includes the server random value, 
session id, selected key exchange suite, selected cipher suite, compression method and 
key refresh period information. 
 
Server sends its certificate after the server hello message. WTLS supports use of 
X509v3, X9.68 or WTLS certificates. It is most suitable to use the WTLS certificates 
because they are optimized for size. Server certificate must be verified by the client 
upon receiving. Verification of a certificate requires the verification of the digital 
signature using the CA (Certification Authority) public key retrieved from the CA 
certificate. The client must also verify the subject, issuer, and the validity time interval 
of the certificate. Authenticated server certificate will be used to compute the premaster 
secret. 
 
The server requests a certificate from the client by sending the certificate request 
message. The next message that will be sent by the server is server hello done message 
which indicates that all necessary server messages have been sent by the server and it is 
waiting for the client response.  
 
The client must send a valid certificate to the server after receiving the server 
hello done message. Even if the client does not have a valid certificate, it must send an 
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empty certificate message to the server. Then the server may continue to the handshake 
or it may terminate the handshake and send a critical error message to the client.  
 
The client key exchange message is sent by the client if RSA key exchange suite 
is used. The certificate sent by the client has the enough information to compute the 
premaster secret if ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suite is used, so the client key 
exchange message is omitted if ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suite is used. Client key 
exchange message contains the encrypted premaster secret when RSA is used. 
Premaster secret decided by the client is encrypted using the server public key retrieved 
from the server certificate. The server decrypts the encrypted premaster secret using its 
private key. 
 
The client must also send the certificate verify message to explicitly verify its 
certificate if RSA key exchange method is used. Certificate verify message includes 
signature of the all previous handshake messages’ hash value. Server must be able to 
verify the signature using the public key retrieved from the client certificate. 
 
After this point the client sends the change cipher spec message and immediately 
sends the client finished message. All the messages sent after the change cipher spec 
message is protected by the security parameters that have been agreed upon. When the 
server receives the change cipher spec message sent by the client, it will send server 
change cipher spec message to the client and all the messages that will be sent by the 
server will also be protected by the same security parameters. The first server message 
under agreed parameters will be the server finished message and the peers can start to 
exchange application data after sending the finished messages. Mutual Authenticated 
WTLS Full Handshake message flow is given at Figure 2.8. 
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Figure 2.8 Mutual authenticated WTLS full handshake message flow 
 
2.4.1.2. Server Authenticated WTLS Full Handshake 
 
Server Authenticated WTLS Full Handshake requires only the server to have a 
valid certificate appropriate to the selected key exchange suite. RSA or ECDH_ECDSA 
key exchange suites can be used in server authenticated WTLS full handshake. 
 
The first handshake message to be sent by the client is the client hello message. 
Client hello message includes client’s random value, key exchange suites supported by 
the client with the client’s first preference first, list of trusted certificates known by the 
client, list of the cryptographic options supported by the client,  version of the WTLS 
protocol, session id, compression methods, and key refresh period. After sending the 
client hello message, the client waits for the server hello message. 
 
The server sends the server hello message to the client after receiving the client 
hello message. Server hello message includes the server random value, session id, 
selected key exchange suite, selected cipher suite, compression method and key refresh 
period information. 
 
Server sends its certificate after the server hello message. Server certificate must 
be verified by the client upon receiving. After the certificate message, server sends the 
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server hello done message which indicates that all necessary server messages have been 
sent by the server and it is waiting for the client response.  
 
The client key exchange message is sent by the client after receiving the server 
hello done message. Premaster secret is set with the client key exchange message. The 
client encrypts the premaster secret using the server’s public key and sends the 
encrypted premaster secret in the client key exchange message. The server then decrypts 
the RSA encrypted premaster secret using its private key.  The client must send its EC 
Diffie-Hellman public key in the client key exchange message to the server. Server uses 
its private key and client’s public key to compute the premaster secret. Similarly, client 
uses its private key and server’s public key to compute the premaster secret. 
 
Client sends the change cipher spec message and the client finished message after 
the client key exchange message. All the messages sent after the change cipher spec 
message is protected by the security parameters that have been agreed upon. When the 
server receives the change cipher spec message sent by the client, it will send server 
change cipher spec message to the client and all the messages that will be sent by the 
server will also be protected by the same security parameters. Server Authenticated 
WTLS Full Handshake message flow is given at Figure 2.9. 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Server authenticated WTLS full handshake message flow 
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2.4.2. Abbreviated Handshake 
 
The client may resume a previously established secure session with the server 
instead of performing a full handshake. In the case of resuming an old secure session, 
the client sends a Client Hello message with the Session ID of the session to be resumed. 
The server checks its secure session cache. If a match is found, the server sends Server 
Change Cipher Spec message and Server Finished message. The client must respond 
with Client Change Cipher Spec message and Client Finished message and peers start to 
exchange application data in a secure manner. If the server can not find the secure 
Session ID in the Client Hello message, it can not resume the previous session and a 
new full handshake is initiated. WTLS Abbreviated Handshake Protocol message flow 
is given at Figure 2.10. 
 
 
Figure 2.10 WTLS abbreviated handshake message flow 
 
2.4.3. Optimized Handshake 
 
When the server receives the Client Hello message, it can retrieve the client’s 
certificate from a distribution center or its own certificate store. For example when the 
client certificate contains the ECDH [22] (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) parameters, 
the server can directly compute the premaster secret and master secret by using the 
certificate retrieved from the store. In this case the server sends its certificate to the 
client, then Server Change Cipher Spec message and Server Finished message. The 
client sends Client Change Cipher Spec message and Client Finished message. After all 
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these messages, application data can be exchanged between the peers. WTLS Optimized 
Handshake Protocol message flow is given at Figure 2.11. 
 
 
Figure 2.11 WTLS optimized handshake message flow 
 
2.5. Master Secret Computation in WTLS Handshake Protocol 
 
Regardless of the key exchange suite used, peers must compute the master secret 
for using in the bulk encryption process after agreeing on the premaster secret. The 
same algorithm is used to convert the premaster secret into the master secret for all 
types of key exchange suites. It is recommended that the premaster secret is deleted 
from memory after computing the master secret. 
 
mastersecret = PRF ( premastersecret, “master secret”,Client.random+Server.random ) ( 2.1 ) 
 
The “+” operation stands for the concatenation of two random values generating a 
new random value as an input to the function. The premaster secret key length may vary 
depending on the key exchange suite selected but the master secret will always be 20 
bytes in length. PRF is the pseudo-random function defined in [5]. 
 
If the RSA key exchange suite is used, premaster secret is determined by the 
client. Client encrypts the premaster secret using the server’s RSA public key and sends 
it to the server in Client Key Exchange Message. The server decrypts the premaster 
secret using its own private key and continues to compute the master secret. 
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If the ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suite is used, the ECDH computation is 
performed and the negotiated key (Z) is used as the premaster secret to compute the 
master secret. 
 
(.)PRF  is defined as: 
 
PRF( secret, label, seed) = P_hash(secret, label+seed) ( 2.2 ) 
 
 
 
),(sec_ datarethashP  is defined as the data expansion function using a single 
hash function. (.)_ hashP  function can be iterated as many times as needed, at each 
iteration it generates additional 20 bytes of output. 
 
P_hash(secret, data)    =   HMAC_hash(secret, A(0)+data) + 
         HMAC_hash(secret, A(1)+data) + 
             HMAC_hash(secret, A(2)+data) + … 
 
( 2.3 ) 
 
Where; 
A(0) = data 
A (i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) 
  
(.)_ hashHMAC  is defined as below: 
 
))((),(_ dataipadKHopadKHdataKhashHMAC +Å+Å=  ( 2.4 ) 
 
Where; 
 
timesrepeatedxbytetheipad 64360=  
 
timesrepeatedCxbytetheopad 6450=  
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(.)H  is one of the allowed cryptographic hash functions in the standard [5]. 
Available hash functions defined in the standard are SHA-1 [28] and MD5 [29]. 
 
It is enough to iterate the (.)_ hashP  function once to generate the 20 byte master 
secret if we use SHA-1 as the cryptographic hash function. 
 
2.6. Previous Work on WTLS and SSL/TLS Performance Analysis 
 
Levi and Savas have proposed an analytical performance model for WTLS 
handshake protocol in [30]. WTLS handshake performance was considered as three 
sub-problems which are client and server processing time, server queue delay and 
transmission time over the network. Three groups of cryptosystems with equal level of 
security using RSA and ECC were compared in the paper. The first group contains RSA 
1024 bit, ECC 160p (prime), ECC 163k (Koblitz), ECC 163r (random) curves. The 
second group contains RSA 2048 bit, ECC 224p, ECC 233k, and ECC 233r curves. The 
last group contains RSA 3072 bit, ECC 256p, ECC 283k, and ECC 283r curves. The 
first two groups of the same security level contain the ECC curves and RSA key lengths 
that are offered by the WTLS standard [5]. The third group is composed of the curves 
that are not in the WTLS standard but offers the level of security that might be needed 
for today’s WAP applications. Public key operations, namely encryption and signature 
verification with public key, decryption and signature generation with private key were 
implemented using state of the art techniques and timing measurements, were done to 
use in the performance model. Overall processing time is significantly lower when 
using ECC public key cryptosystems for both server authenticated and mutual 
authenticated WTLS Full Handshake. They model the server as an M/M/1 queue, so the 
queue delay is computed by using the well known formula )1/( rr -sT , where sT  is the 
average server processing time and r  is the utilization factor. The data transmission 
time is computed as RLTdata /8= , where R  is the data transmission rate in bits and L  
is the overall data size transmitted in bytes. The performance model proposed is 
successfully considering the necessary terms that may be a bottleneck of the WTLS 
handshake. Practically M/M/1 model is not well suited for computing the queue delay 
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because the average processing time of each intermediate handshake messages must be 
considered separately (not the overall handshake processing time) and also the model 
does not include the extra networking time that may come out when using different 
types of data bearers. 
 
Apostolopoulos et. al. take a close look at the SSL protocol, the ancestor of 
WTLS, with an eye on performance in [31] and [32]. They benchmark the performance 
of industry wide web servers Netscape and Apache, and quantify the overheads of 
different components of SSL protocol using SPECWeb96 [33] benchmark tool. They 
vary the degree of session reuse from 0 to 100 percent. SSL performance improves as 
the ratio of session reuse increases. Protocol overhead is analyzed associated with the 
SSL handshake protocol, encryption and authentication during data transfer. 
Performance analysis of SSL handshake protocol is affected by an increase in data 
volume due to additional data items and computational overhead for crypto functions. 
Server authenticated WTLS full handshake measurements were done using 512 bit, 768 
bit and 1024 bit RSA public keys, ECDH key agreement is not in the analysis scope. 
They conclude the performance analysis with the finding that the crypto operation 
bottleneck comes from private key operation performed at the server for server 
authenticated WTLS handshake using RSA key exchange scheme. 
 
Herwono and Liebhardt have done simulation-based performance measurements 
of the WTLS protocol in [34]. They simulate the relevant protocols WTP [17], WTLS 
[5] and WDP [18]. The benchmark software was coded using C/C++. Handshake 
durations for four types of full handshake and one optimized handshake were compared. 
The key exchange schemes considered are RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, ECDH_ECDSA 
(optimized), RSA_anon and ECDH_anon. The key length of RSA types was chosen 
1024 bit and ECC key length was chosen 160 bit respectively. They vary the effective 
mean channel throughput from 1 kbit/s to 20 kbit/s. Handshake duration decreases up to 
a point as the network throughput increases. Increase in the network throughput does 
not affect the handshake duration after approximately 8-10 kbit/s. Systems with higher 
network throughputs have the crypto operations processing time as an upper bound for 
the handshake. On the other hand, the crypto operations processing time become 
negligible for network throughputs lower than 5 kbit/s. The transmission time is 
seriously a bottleneck for those types of systems. 
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Herwono and Liebhardt has a similar work that compares RSA_anon (2048 bit), 
ECDH_anon (224 bit), RSA_anon (1024 bit), and ECDH_anon (160 bit) in [35]. As an 
expected result, ECDH key agreement overall handshake durations are lower then RSA 
equivalent ones. 
 
Krishna et. al. [36] analyze the performance and architectural impact of SSL in 
terms of throughput, number of processors, handshake frequency etc. Server public key 
used is RSA 512 bit and private key encryption used is 128 bit RC4. They consider 
three different cases for the SSL handshake. The first case is the SSL handshake 
followed by a very small data transfer. The second case is the SSL handshake followed 
by encrypted transfer of a huge size web page. The last case is the SSL handshake 
followed by 36 KB(determined average web page size) web page transfer. Results of 
the simulations show that the overall handshake duration is significantly higher for the 
first case which shows that the number of handshake operations is a key factor for SSL 
handshake performance. 
 
Gupta et. al. present an estimation of the performance improvements that can be 
expected in SSL protocol by adding ECC support in [37]. They modify the OpenSSL 
[38] cryptographic library OpenSSL0.9.6.b to support ECDH, ECDSA and X.509 
certificates with ECC parameters. The analytical model especially considers the 
handshake crypto latency and server crypto throughput however they are also aware of 
the extra delays due to message parsing, hashing and network latency. RSA (1024-2048 
bit) and ECDH_ECDSA (163-193 bit) handshakes are compared in three cases. One of 
these three cases is a client talking to an Ultra 80 server simulating a wireless web 
scenario. They measure the performance of public key algorithms for RSA encrypt, 
verify, decrypt and sign, ECDSA verify and sign operations and use these values at their 
analytical model. The results show that 1024 bit RSA performs better than 163 bit ECC 
curve while 193 bit ECC curve is faster then 2048 bit RSA for server authenticated SSL 
handshake. ECDH key agreement is faster for both key sizes when mutual authenticated 
SSL handshake is performed. 
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3. WTLS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
The performance evaluation model includes three main factors that may be 
bottleneck for the WTLS handshake protocol: 
 
i. Processing time for all cryptographic operations and message parsing 
operations performed during the handshake 
ii. Queue delay due to the load on the WAP gateway 
iii. Transmission time of the handshake messages 
 
There are also some other sources of delay like parallel processes at the server or 
client etc. that may effect the handshake duration but these are thought to be negligible 
when considering the above three factors. 
 
Mutual Authenticated WTLS Full Handshake and Server Authenticated WTLS 
Full Handshake performance was considered separately and two different performance 
models were proposed although the models conceptually have the same properties.  
 
The overall handshake duration is modeled as: 
 
  QDTDPDH TTTT ++=  ( 3.1 ) 
 
The notation used in Eq. ( 3.1 ) is defined in Table 3.1. 
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Symbol Meaning 
HT  Overall handshake duration 
PDT   Total processing delay of handshake messages 
TDT   Transmission delay of handshake messages 
QDT   Server queue delay 
Table 3.1 Overall handshake duration notations 
 
Performance model includes 48 cases, 24 of which is Mutual Authenticated and 
the remaining 24 cases are Server Authenticated WTLS handshake. Three categories of 
different security level have been considered. Each category includes four groups of the 
same level of security. Cryptosystems that have the same level of security have been 
given in Table 2.2. Three of the four groups in a category are ECDH_ECDSA key 
exchange suites that use prime, Koblitz and random ECC curve parameters. The last 
group contains the RSA key exchange suites that offer the same level of security 
compared to the ECC curves in the same category. These categories and groups will be 
referred wherever necessary in the performance model and analysis. CA certificate 
public key parameter specifier and the corresponding client/server certificate public key 
parameter specifier uniquely specify a key exchange suite. Available parameter 
specifiers that will be used in the model are given in Table 3.2. Three categories and 
corresponding four groups of each category are given in Table 3.3. 
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Public Key Type Parameter Specifier 
ECC 1 (wtls7_160) 
ECC 2 (nist163k) 
ECC 3 (nist163r) 
RSA 20 (RSA1024) 
ECC 5 (nist224p) 
ECC 6 (nist233k) 
ECC 7 (nist233r) 
RSA 21 (RSA2048) 
ECC 8 (nist256p) 
ECC 9 (nist283k) 
ECC 10 (nist283r) 
RSA 22 (RSA3072) 
Table 3.2 Public key parameter specifiers 
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Category # 
 
Group # 
CA Certificate 
parameter specifier 
Client/Server 
Certificate parameter 
specifier 
1 1 (wtls7_160) 1 (wtls7_160) 
2 2 (nist163k) 2 (nist163k) 
3 3 (nist163r) 3 (nist163r) 
 
 
1 
4 20 (RSA1024) 20 (RSA1024) 
5 (nist224p) 1 (wtls7_160)  
1 5 (nist224p) 5 (nist224p) 
6 (nist233k) 2 (nist163k)  
2 6 (nist233k) 6 (nist233k) 
7 (nist233r) 3 (nist163r)  
3 7 (nist233r) 7 (nist233r) 
21 (RSA2048) 20 (RSA1024) 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
4 21 (RSA2048) 21 (RSA2048) 
8 (nist256p) 1 (wtls7_160) 
8 (nist256p) 5 (nist224p) 
 
1 
8 (nist256p) 8 (nist256p) 
9 (nist283k) 2 (nist163k) 
9 (nist283k) 6 (nist233k) 
 
2 
9 (nist283k) 9 (nist283k) 
10 (nist283r) 3 (nist163r) 
10 (nist283r) 7 (nist233r) 
 
3 
10 (nist283r) 10 (nist283r) 
22 (RSA3072) 20 (RSA1024) 
22 (RSA3072) 21 (RSA2048) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
4 
22 (RSA3072) 22 (RSA3072) 
Table 3.3 Performance model categories and groups  
 
The following three sections give the performance model for Mutual 
Authenticated and Server Authenticated WTLS Full Handshake.  
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3.1. Processing Time Model 
 
The performance model does not exclude the handshake messages that do not 
contain any public key operation. Processing delays for both generating the message at 
the client or server and processing of the message at the opposite side are considered. 
Some of the handshake messages’ processing delays are expected to be almost 
independent of the key exchange suite selected because of using the same algorithm for 
any of the key exchange suite or messages do not contain any cryptography related 
operations at all. 
 
Depending on the key exchange suite selected, applicable handshake messages 
will be different and processing time for those not applicable messages will be accepted 
as 0 in the model to be able to give a common formula for RSA and ECDH_ECDSA 
key exchange suites. Regardless of which one of the performance model categories or 
groups are used, the processing time model is only based on whether it is mutual or 
server authenticated WTLS handshake. 
 
3.1.1. Mutual Authenticated WTLS Full Handshake 
 
Mutual Authenticated WTLS Full Handshake time interval notations for each 
handshake message are given in Table 3.4. 
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Symbol Meaning 
CHCMT __  Client processing time for generating the Client.Hello message 
SHCMT __  Client processing time for processing Server.Hello message 
SCERTCMT __  Client processing time for processing the server certificate 
CERTREQCMT __  Client processing time for processing the CertificateRequest 
message 
SHDCMT __  Client processing time for processing the ServerHelloDone 
message 
CCERTCMT __  Client processing time for generating the Client.Certificate 
message 
CKXCMT __  Client processing time for generating the ClientKeyExchange 
message (message is sent  iff RSA key exchange suite is used) 
CERTVRFYCMT __  Client processing time for generating the CertificateVerify 
message (applicable if RSA key exchange suite is used) 
CCCSCMT __  Client processing time for generating the Client 
ChangeCipherSpec message 
CFINCMT __  Client processing time for generating the Client.Finished 
message 
SCCSCMT __  Client processing time for processing the Server 
ChangeCipherSpec message 
SFINCMT __  Client processing time for processing the Server.Finished 
message 
ECDHCMT __  Client processing time for ECDH operation (applicable if 
ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suite is used) 
MSCMT __  Client processing time for computing the master secret from the 
premaster secret 
RSAENCCMT __  Client processing time for encryption operation using the 
Server’s public key (applicable if RSA key exchange suite is 
used) 
CPDT _  Overall processing time for the client side 
CHSMT __  Server processing time for processing the Client.Hello message 
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Symbol Meaning 
SHSMT __  Server processing time for generating the Server.Hello message 
SCERTSMT __  Server processing time for generating the Server.Certificate 
message 
CERTREQSMT __  Server processing time for generating the CertificateRequest 
message 
SHDSMT __  Server processing time for generating the ServerHelloDone 
message 
CCERTSMT __  Server processing time for processing the client certificate 
CKXSMT __  Server processing time for processing the ClientKeyExchange 
message 
CERTVRFYSMT __  Server processing time for processing the CertificateVerify 
message (applicable if RSA key exchange suite is used) 
CCCSSMT __  Server processing time for processing the Client 
ChangeCipherSpec message 
CFINSMT __  Server processing time for processing the Client.Finished 
message 
SCCSSMT __  Server processing time for generating the Server 
ChangeCipherSpec message 
SFINSMT __  Server processing time for generating the Server.Finished 
message 
ECDHSMT __  Server processing time for ECDH operation (applicable if 
ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suite is used) 
MSSMT __  Server processing time for computing the master secret from 
the premaster secret 
RSADECSMT __  Server processing time for decryption operation using its own 
private key (applicable if RSA key exchange suite is used) 
SPDT _  Overall processing time for the server side 
Table 3.4 Mutual authenticated WTLS full handshake performance model notations 
 
Mutual Authenticated WTLS Full Handshake message flow is given in Table 3.5. 
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Client 
Processing 
Time 
 
Message(Client) 
  
Message(Server) 
Server 
Processing 
Time 
CHCMT __  ClientHello à  CHSMT __  
SHCMT __   ß ServerHello SHSMT __  
SCERTCMT __   ß Certificate SCERTSMT __  
CERTREQCMT __   ß CertificateReq CERTREQSMT __  
SHDCMT __   ß ServerHelloDone SHDSMT __  
CCERTCMT __  Certificate à  CCERTSMT __  
CKXCMT __  ClientKeyExchange 
(if RSA) 
à  
CKXSMT __  
CERTVRFYCMT __  CertificateVerify 
(if RSA) 
à  
CERTVRFYSMT __  
CCCSCMT __  ChangeCipherSpec à  CCCSSMT __  
CFINCMT __  Finished à  CFINSMT __  
SCCSCMT __   ß ChangeCipherSpec SCCSSMT __  
SFINCMT __   ß Finished SFINSMT __  
Table 3.5 Mutual authenticated WTLS full handshake message flow 
 
Using the notation given up to here, the total processing delay of handshake 
messages for Mutual Authenticated WTLS Handshake Protocol PDT  can be given as the 
sum of client side processing time and the server side processing time. 
 
Client side processing time CPDT _ ; 
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CPDT _ = CHCMT __ + SHCMT __ + SCERTCMT __ + CERTREQCMT __ + SHDCMT __ + CCERTCMT __ +
CKXCMT __ + CERTVRFYCMT __ + CCCSCMT __ + CFINCMT __ + SCCSCMT __ +
SFINCMT __ + CHSMT __          ( 3.2 ) 
 
Server side processing time SPDT _ ; 
 
SPDT _ = SHSMT __ + SCERTSMT __ + CERTREQSMT __ + SHDSMT __ + CCERTSMT __ + CKXSMT __ +
CERTVRFYSMT __ + CCCSSMT __ + CFINSMT __ + SCCSSMT __ + SFINSMT __    ( 3.3 ) 
 
Overall processing time PDT ; 
 
PDT  = SPDT _  + CPDT _       ( 3.4 ) 
 
Although the model includes 24 additive components of the handshake processing 
delays, some of these processing delays are expected to be more affective on the total 
processing time. Those messages and operations that need special care are defined 
below. 
 
SCERTCMT __  : This is the client processing time for verifying the received server 
certificate. Certificate verification operation is not bounded with the certificate signature 
verification using the CA public key. Correctness and validity of the information in the 
certificate must also be checked for. Subject of the certificate must match with the 
previously known gateway identity, the issuer of the certificate must be the same with 
the CA certificate’s subject, the certificate must not be used for any time interval that it 
is not valid etc. 
 
CCERTSMT __ : This is the server processing time for verifying the received client 
certificate. Certificate verification process is the same as described for SCERTCMT __ . 
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CKXCMT __ : This message is sent only when the RSA key exchange scheme is used. 
The premaster secret is set during preparation of this message so the master secret is 
computed following this message regardless of the key exchange suite selected. If RSA 
key exchange suite is used, premaster secret is encrypted using the gateway’s public key 
derived from the gateway certificate( RSAENCCMT __ ).ECDH operation is performed to 
compute the premaster secret ( ECDHCMT __ ) if ECDH_ECDSA key exchange is used. 
After computing the premaster secret, the client computes the master secret ( MSCMT __ ) 
as described in Section 2.5.  
 
CKXSMT __ : If ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suite is used, all the computation is 
identical with described for the client side CKXCMT __ . If RSA key exchange suite is used, 
the server must perform a private key operation to decrypt the premaster secret which 
was encrypted by the client using gateway’s RSA public key. 
 
CERTVRFYCMT __ : Only performed when RSA key exchange suite is used. 
CertificateVerify message’s objective is to explicitly verify the certificate of the client. 
The client generates a hash value of all of the handshake messages prior to this one and 
signs the hash value using its RSA private key with signing capability. 
 
CERTVRFYSMT __ : This is the server processing time to verify the signature sent by 
the client to the gateway in the CertificateVerify message. This operation includes a 
public key signature verification operation. 
 
CFINCMT __ , CFINSMT __ , SFINCMT __ , SFINSMT __ : These are the processing times 
related to the generation and verification of the finished messages. Similar to the 
CertificateVerify message, finished messages are also performed on the hash value of 
all handshake messages prior to the corresponding message together with a finished 
label and master secret. The (.)PRF  described in Section 2.5 is used to generate and 
verify the finish messages. 
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Typically due to the low computational power of the mobile clients, the 
cryptographic operations performed at the client side are also expected to be much more 
point of interest when considering the overall processing delay for Mutual 
Authenticated WTLS Handshake. Especially CERTVRFYCMT __  is willing to be on the top 
of the list because of the high cost private key operation performed on the resource 
constrained client environment. 
 
3.1.2. Server Authenticated WTLS Full Handshake 
 
Server Authenticated WTLS Full Handshake time interval notations for each 
handshake message are given in Table 3.6. 
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Symbol Meaning 
CHCST __  Average client processing time for generating the Client.Hello 
message 
SHCST __  Average client processing time for processing Server.Hello 
message 
SCERTCST __  Average client processing time for processing the server 
certificate 
CERTREQCST __  Average client processing time for processing the 
CertificateRequest message 
SHDCST __  Average client processing time for processing the 
ServerHelloDone message 
CCERTCST __  Average client processing time for generating the 
Client.Certificate message 
CKXCST __  Average client processing time for generating the 
ClientKeyExchange message  
CCCSCST __  Average client processing time for generating the Client 
ChangeCipherSpec message 
CFINCST __  Average client processing time for generating the 
Client.Finished message 
SCCSCST __  Average client processing time for processing the Server 
ChangeCipherSpec message 
SFINCST __  Average client processing time for processing the 
Server.Finished message 
ECDHCST __  Average client processing time for ECDH operation (applicable 
if ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suite is used) 
MSCST __  Average client processing time for computing the master secret 
from the premaster secret 
RSAENCCST __  Average client processing time for encryption operation using 
the Server’s public key (applicable if RSA key exchange suite 
is used) 
CHSST __  Average server processing time for processing the Client.Hello 
message 
SHSST __  Average server processing time for generating the Server.Hello 
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Symbol Meaning 
message 
SCERTSST __  Average server processing time for generating the 
Server.Certificate message 
CERTREQSST __  Average server processing time for generating the 
CertificateRequest message 
SHDSST __  Average server processing time for generating the 
ServerHelloDone message 
CCERTSST __  Average server processing time for processing the client 
certificate 
CKXSST __  Average server processing time for processing the 
ClientKeyExchange message 
CCCSSST __  Average server processing time for processing the Client 
ChangeCipherSpec message 
CFINSST __  Average server processing time for processing the 
Client.Finished message 
SCCSSST __  Average server processing time for generating the Server 
ChangeCipherSpec message 
SFINSST __  Average server processing time for generating the 
Server.Finished message 
ECDHSST __  Average server processing time for ECDH operation 
(applicable if ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suite is used) 
MSSST __  Average server processing time for computing the master secret 
from the premaster secret 
RSADECSST __  Average server processing time for decryption operation using 
its own private key (applicable if RSA key exchange suite is 
used) 
Table 3.6 Server authenticated WTLS full handshake performance model notations 
 
Server Authenticated WTLS Full Handshake message flow is given in Table 3.7. 
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Client 
Processing 
Time 
Message(Client)  Message(Server) Server 
Processing 
Time 
CHCST __  ClientHello à  CHSST __  
SHCST __   ß ServerHello SHSST __  
SCERTCST __   ß Certificate SCERTSST __  
CERTREQCST __   ß CertificateReq CERTREQSST __  
SHDCST __   ß ServerHelloDone SHDSST __  
 
CCERTCST __  
Certificate 
(includes no 
certificate) 
à   
CCERTSST __  
CKXCST __  ClientKeyExchange à  CKXSST __  
CCCSCST __  ChangeCipherSpec à  CCCSSST __  
CFINCST __  Finished à  CFINSST __  
SCCSCST __   ß ChangeCipherSpec SCCSSST __  
SFINCST __   ß Finished SFINSST __  
Table 3.7 Server authenticated WTLS full handshake message flow 
 
The total processing delay of handshake messages for Server Authenticated 
WTLS Handshake Protocol PDT  can be given as the sum of client side processing time 
and the server side processing time. 
 
Client side processing time CPDT _ ; 
 
CPDT _ = CHCST __ + SHCST __ + SCERTCST __ + CERTREQCST __ + SHDCST __ + CCERTCST __ +
CKXCST __ + CCCSCST __ + CFINCST __ + SCCSCST __ + SFINCST __      ( 3.5 ) 
 
Server side processing time SPDT _ ; 
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SPDT _ = CHSST __ + SHSST __ + SCERTSST __ + CERTREQSST __ + SHDSST __ + CCERTSST __ +
CKXSST __ + CCCSSST __ + CFINSST __ + SCCSSST __ + SFINSST __     ( 3.6 ) 
 
Overall processing time PDT ; 
 
PDT  = SPDT _  + CPDT _       ( 3.7 ) 
 
The model includes 22 additive components of the handshake processing delays. 
Some of these processing delays are expected to be more affective on the total 
processing time.  
 
SCERTCST __  : This is the client processing time for verifying the received server 
certificate. Certificate verification operation is not bounded with the certificate signature 
verification using the CA public key. Correctness and validity of the information in the 
certificate must also be checked for. Subject of the certificate must match with the 
previously known gateway identity, the issuer of the certificate must be the same with 
the CA certificate’s subject, the certificate must not be used for any time interval that it 
is not valid etc. 
 
CKXCST __ : This message is sent for both RSA and ECDH_ECDSA key exchange 
suites. The premaster secret is set during preparation of this message so the master 
secret is computed following this message regardless of the key exchange suite selected. 
If RSA key exchange suite is used, premaster secret is encrypted using the gateway’s 
public key derived from the gateway certificate ( RSAENCCST __ ). ECDH operation is 
performed to compute the premaster secret ( ECDHCST __ ) If ECDH_ECDSA key 
exchange suite is used. After computing the premaster secret, the client computes the 
master secret ( MSCST __ ) as described in Section 2.5.  
 
CKXSST __ : If ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suite is used, all the computation is 
identical with described for the client side CKXCST __ . If RSA key exchange suite is used, 
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the server must perform a private key operation to decrypt the premaster secret which 
was encrypted by the client using gateway’s RSA public key. 
 
CFINCST __ , CFINSST __ , SFINCST __ , SFINSST __ : These are the processing times 
related to the generation and verification of the finished messages. Finished messages 
are generated by using the hash value of all handshake messages prior to the 
corresponding message  together with a finished label and master secret. The (.)PRF  
described in Section 2.5 is used to generate and verify the finish messages. 
 
Typically due to the low computational power of the mobile clients, the 
cryptographic operations performed at the client side are also expected to be much more 
point of interest when considering the overall processing delay for Server Authenticated 
WTLS Handshake.  
 
3.2. Queue Delay Model 
 
Queue delay is the time that a WTLS handshake message has to wait for the 
service. Generally the queue delay depends on the number of servers, average service 
time, and arrival rate. The server is modeled as an M/G/1 queue with the assumptions 
given below: 
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A simple representation of the queue delay components is given in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Server queue delay components 
 
Server waiting time for a handshake message is the sum of mean time needed to 
serve the customers ahead in the queue and unfinished work in the server. Eq. ( 3.8 )  
gives a general representation of the server waiting time. [39] 
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( 3.8 ) 
 
We can express the mean queue length [ ]NqE  in terms of the waiting time [ ]WE  
as given in Eq. ( 3.9 ). 
 
  [ ] [ ]WENqE l=  ( 3.9 ) 
 
 
Substituting Eq. ( 3.9 )in Eq. ( 3.8 ); 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]( ) [ ]RExEWE
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We find: 
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( 3.10 ) 
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Therefore, it remains to determine the unfinished work in the server [ ]RE , to 
represent the server waiting time [ ]WE . 
 
The residual service time [ ]RE  can be deduced by using Figure 3.2 which 
represents the evolution of the unfinished work in the server, as a function of time. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Evolution of the unfinished work in the server 
 
Consider a long interval of time t. The average value of the sawtooth curve in 
Figure 3.2 can be calculated by dividing the sum of the areas of the triangles by the 
length of the interva l. 
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( 3.11 ) 
 
Substituting ( 3.11 ) in ( 3.10 ), we can derive the final function for the server 
waiting time as given below. 
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( 3.12 ) 
 
Where; 
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l   : Arrival rate 
[ ] 22 XXE =  : Second moment of service time 
[ ]XElr =  : Utilization (load) of the server 
[ ] XXE =  : Average service time 
 
Eq. ( 3.12 ) which is in fact the P-K (Pollaczek-Khinchin) formula [39],  will be 
used to model the queue delay. Regarding which type of client/server certificate and CA 
certificate has been used, average service time X  and second moment of service time 
2X  changes. I will consider these values for different cases and interpret the queuing 
delay as a function of arrival rate l . 
 
Queue delay is affected by only the messages which the server (WAP Gateway) 
accepts. This is because the messages waiting to be served in the queue are the reason 
for queue delay and those messages are only the incoming handshake messages coming 
form the clients.  
 
Processing time intervals that need to be considered for a mutual authenticated 
WTLS handshake are given in Table 3.8. 
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Message(Client)  Message(Server) Server Processing 
Time 
ClientHello à  
CHSMT __  
 ß ServerHello  
 ß Certificate  
 ß CertificateReq  
 ß ServerHelloDone  
Certificate à  
CCERTSMT __  
ClientKeyExchange 
(if RSA) 
à  
CKXSMT __  
CertificateVerify 
(if RSA) 
à  
CERTVRFYSMT __  
ChangeCipherSpec à  
CCCSSMT __  
Finished à  
CFINSMT __  
 ß ChangeCipherSpec  
 ß Finished  
Table 3.8 Mutual authenticated handshake message flow for  queue delay analysis 
 
Processing time intervals that need to be considered for a server authenticated 
WTLS handshake are given in Table 3.9. 
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Message(Client)  Message(Server) Server Processing 
Time 
ClientHello à  
CHSST __  
 ß ServerHello  
 ß Certificate  
 ß CertificateReq  
 ß ServerHelloDone  
Certificate 
(includes no 
certificate) 
à   
CCERTSST __  
ClientKeyExchange à  
CKXSST __  
ChangeCipherSpec à  
CCCSSST __  
Finished à  
CFINSST __  
 ß ChangeCipherSpec  
 ß Finished  
Table 3.9 Server authenticated handshake message flow for queue delay analysis 
 
Average service time X  and the second moment of the service time 2X  will be 
presented as a function of the available handshake messages processing times for both 
mutual authenticated and server authenticated WTLS full handshake. 
 
For the mutual authenticated case, 
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( 3.13 ) 
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( 3.15 ) 
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For the server authenticated case, 
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__________
messagesapplicableofnumber
TTTTT
X CFINSSCCCSSSCKXSSCCERTSSCHSS
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( 3.16 ) 
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( 3.17 ) 
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( 3.18 ) 
 
The average service times will be presented in the terms of three possible service 
times that may be used for a given group. Handshake messages processing times for 
each one of the three possible key exchange suites specified by public key parameters 
specifiers given in Table 3.3 will affect the average service time for the corresponding 
handshake message depending on its ratio p . 
 
Queue delay model will be proposed for category#3. The same logic applies for 
the other categories with a slight change in the notation. Further analysis needs to 
introduce new formulations : 
 
        ccXccbcXbcacXacX TpTpTpT ,,,,,,,,, ++=  ( 3.19 ) 
  
        1,,, =++ ccbcac ppp  ( 3.20 ) 
 
Meanings of the symbols used in the above formulas are given in Table 3.10. 
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Symbol Meaning 
XT  Average service time for any of the applicable handshake messages for a 
given group 
acXT ,,  Average service time for any of the applicable handshake messages for the 
key exchange suite with the smallest public key size in a group. 
bcXT ,,  Average service time for any of the applicable handshake messages for the 
key exchange suite with the intermediate public key size in a group. 
ccXT ,,  Average service time for any of the applicable handshake messages for the 
key exchange suite with the highest public key size in a group. 
acp ,  Ratio of the key exchange suite with the smallest public key size in a 
group where ‘c’ represents the CA certificate public key parameter 
specifier, and ‘a’ represents the client/server certificate public key 
parameter specifier. 
bcp ,  Ratio of the key exchange suite with the intermediate public key size in a 
group where ‘c’ represents the CA certificate public key parameter 
specifier, and ‘b’ represents the client/server certificate public key 
parameter specifier. 
ccp ,  Ratio of the key exchange suite with the highest public key size in a group 
where ‘c’ represents the CA certificate public key parameter specifier and, 
client/server certificate public key parameter specifier. 
Table 3.10 Average service time formula notations 
 
All the notation and formulas have been defined to present the queue delay 
modeling. The next step will be to define the individual queue delay models for all 
groups regarding mutual authenticated and server authenticated WTLS full handshake. 
 
3.2.1. Category#3-Group#1 – Mutual Authentication 
 
Queue delay model for category#3-group#1 mutual authenticated WTLS full 
handshake will be given in this section. 
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CA certificate public key 
parameter specifier 
Client/Server certificate public 
key parameter specifier 
Expected Ratio 
8 (nist256p) 1 (wtls7_160) 
1,8p  
8 (nist256p) 5 (nist224p) 
5,8p  
8 (nist256p) 8 (nist256p) 
8,8p  
Table 3.11 Category#3-Group#1 
 
Using Eq. ( 3.13 ), Eq. ( 3.14 ) and Eq. ( 3.15 ), average services time and the 
second moment of the service time can be interpreted as: 
 
        
( )
4
________ CFINSMCCCSSMCCERTSMCHSM TTTTX
+++
=  
( 3.21 ) 
  
        ( )
4
__
2
__
2
__
2
__
2
2 CFINSMCCCSSMCCERTSMCHSM TTTTX
+++
=  ( 3.22 ) 
 
Eq. ( 3.19 ) and Eq. ( 3.20 ) states that: 
 
       8,8,__8,85,8,__5,81,8,__1,8__ CHSMCHSMCHSMCHSM TpTpTpT ++=   ( 3.23 ) 
  
       8,8,__8,85,8,__5,81,8,__1,8__ CCERTSMCCERTSMCCERTSMCCERTSM TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.24 ) 
  
         8,8,__8,85,8,__5,81,8,__1,8__ CCCSSMCCCSSMCCCSSMCCCSSM TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.25 ) 
  
          8,8,__8,85,8,__5,81,8,__1,8__ CFINSMCFINSMCFINSMCFINSM TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.26 ) 
  
            18,85,81,8 =++ ppp  ( 3.27 ) 
 
QDT  is computed using Eq. ( 3.12 ). 
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3.2.2. Category#3-Group#1 – Server Authentication 
 
Queue delay model for category#3-group#1 server authenticated WTLS full 
handshake will be given in this section. 
 
CA certificate public key 
parameter specifier 
Server certificate public key 
parameter specifier 
Expected Ratio 
8 (nist256p) 1 (wtls7_160) 
1,8p  
8 (nist256p) 5 (nist224p) 
5,8p  
8 (nist256p) 8 (nist256p) 
8,8p  
Table 3.12 Category#3-Group#1 
 
Using Eq. ( 3.16 ), Eq. ( 3.17 ) and Eq. ( 3.18 ), average services time and the 
second moment of the service time can be interpreted as: 
 
        
( )
5
__________ CFINSMCCCSSMCKXSSCCERTSSCHSS TTTTTX
++++
=  
( 3.28 ) 
  
         
( )
5
__
2
__
2
__
2
__
2
__
2
2 CFINSMCCCSSMCKXSSCCERTSSCHSS TTTTTX
++++
=  
( 3.29 ) 
 
Eq. ( 3.19 ) and Eq. ( 3.20 ) states that: 
 
        8,8,__8,85,8,__5,81,8,__1,8__ CHSSCHSSCHSSCHSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.30 ) 
  
        8,8,__8,85,8,__5,81,8,__1,8__ CCERTSSCCERTSSCCERTSSCCERTSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.31 ) 
  
        8,8,__8,85,8,__5,81,8,__1,8__ CKXSSCKXSSCKXSSCKXSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.32 ) 
  
         8,8,__8,85,8,__5,81,8,__1,8__ CCCSSSCCCSSSCCCSSSCCCSSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.33 ) 
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        8,8,__8,85,8,__5,81,8,__1,8__ CFINSSCFINSSCFINSSCFINSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.34 ) 
  
        18,85,81,8 =++ ppp  ( 3.35 ) 
 
QDT  is computed using Eq. ( 3.12 ). 
 
3.2.3. Category#3-Group#2 – Mutual Authentication 
 
Queue delay model for category#3-group#2 mutual authenticated WTLS full 
handshake will be given in this section. 
 
CA certificate public key 
parameter specifier 
Client/Server certificate public 
key parameter specifier 
Expected Ratio 
9 (nist283k) 2 (nist163k) 
2,9p  
9 (nist283k) 6 (nist233k) 
6,9p  
9 (nist283k) 9 (nist283k) 
9,9p  
Table 3.13 Category#3-Group#2 
 
Using Eq. ( 3.13 ), Eq. ( 3.14 ) and Eq. ( 3.15 ), average services time and the 
second moment of the service time can be interpreted as: 
 
        
( )
4
________ CFINSMCCCSSMCCERTSMCHSM TTTTX
+++
=  
( 3.36 ) 
  
        ( )
4
__
2
__
2
__
2
__
2
2 CFINSMCCCSSMCCERTSMCHSM TTTTX
+++
=  ( 3.37 ) 
 
Eq. ( 3.19 ) and Eq. ( 3.20 ) states that: 
 
        9,9,__9,96,9,__6,92,9,__2,9__ CHSMCHSMCHSMCHSM TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.38 ) 
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        9,9,__9,96,9,__6,92,9,__2,9__ CCERTSMCCERTSMCCERTSMCCERTSM TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.39 ) 
  
        9,9,__9,96,9,__6,92,9,__2,9__ CCCSSMCCCSSMCCCSSMCCCSSM TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.40 ) 
  
        9,9,__9,96,9,__6,92,9,__2,9__ CFINSMCFINSMCFINSMCFINSM TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.41 ) 
  
        19,96,92,9 =++ ppp  ( 3.42 ) 
 
QDT  is computed using Eq. ( 3.12 ). 
 
3.2.4. Category#3-Group#2 – Server Authentication 
 
Queue delay model for category#3-group#2 server authenticated WTLS full 
handshake will be given in this section. 
 
CA certificate public key 
parameter specifier 
Server certificate public key 
parameter specifier 
Expected Ratio 
9 (nist283k) 2 (nist163k) 
2,9p  
9 (nist283k) 6 (nist233k) 
6,9p  
9 (nist283k) 9 (nist283k) 
9,9p  
Table 3.14 Category#3-Group#2 
 
Using Eq. ( 3.16 ), Eq. ( 3.17 ) and Eq. ( 3.18 ), average services time and the 
second moment of the service time can be interpreted as: 
 
        
( )
5
__________ CFINSMCCCSSMCKXSSCCERTSSCHSS TTTTTX
++++
=  
( 3.43 ) 
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        ( )
5
__
2
__
2
__
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__
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2
2 CFINSMCCCSSMCKXSSCCERTSSCHSS TTTTTX ++++=  
( 3.44 ) 
 
Eq. ( 3.19 ) and Eq. ( 3.20 ) states that: 
 
        9,9,__9,96,9,__6,92,9,__2,9__ CHSSCHSSCHSSCHSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.45 ) 
  
        9,9,__9,96,9,__6,92,9,__2,9__ CCERTSSCCERTSSCCERTSSCCERTSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.46 ) 
  
        9,9,__9,96,9,__6,92,9,__2,9__ CKXSSCKXSSCKXSSCKXSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.47 ) 
  
        9,9,__9,96,9,__6,92,9,__2,9__ CCCSSSCCCSSSCCCSSSCCCSSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.48 ) 
  
        9,9,__9,96,9,__6,92,9,__2,9__ CFINSSCFINSSCFINSSCFINSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.49 ) 
  
        19,96,92,9 =++ ppp  ( 3.50 ) 
 
QDT  is computed using Eq. ( 3.12 ). 
 
3.2.5. Category#3-Group#3 – Mutual Authentication 
 
Queue delay model for category#3-group#3 mutual authenticated WTLS full 
handshake will be given in this section. 
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CA certificate public key 
parameter specifier 
Client/Server certificate public 
key parameter specifier 
Expected Ratio 
10 (nist283r) 3 (nist163r) 
3,10p  
10 (nist283r) 7 (nist233r) 
7,10p  
10 (nist283r) 10 (nist283r) 
10,10p  
Table 3.15 Category#3-Group#3 
 
Using Eq. ( 3.13 ), Eq. ( 3.14 ) and Eq. ( 3.15 ), average services time and the 
second moment of the service time can be interpreted as: 
 
        
( )
4
________ CFINSMCCCSSMCCERTSMCHSM TTTTX
+++
=  
( 3.51 ) 
  
        ( )
4
__
2
__
2
__
2
__
2
2 CFINSMCCCSSMCCERTSMCHSM TTTTX
+++
=  ( 3.52 ) 
 
Eq. ( 3.19 ) and Eq. ( 3.20 ) states that: 
 
     10,10,__10,107,10,__7,103,10,__3,10__ CHSMCHSMCHSMCHSM TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.53 ) 
  
     10,10,__10,107,10,__7,103,10,__3,10__ CCERTSMCCERTSMCCERTSMCCERTSM TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.54 ) 
  
     10,10,__10,107,10,__7,103,10,__3,10__ CCCSSMCCCSSMCCCSSMCCCSSM TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.55 ) 
  
      10,10,__10,107,10,__7,103,10,__3,10__ CFINSMCFINSMCFINSMCFINSM TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.56 ) 
  
        110,107,103,10 =++ ppp  ( 3.57 ) 
 
QDT  is computed using Eq. ( 3.12 ). 
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3.2.6. Category#3-Group#3 – Server Authentication 
 
Queue delay model for category#3-group#3 server authenticated WTLS full 
handshake will be given in this section. 
 
CA certificate public key 
parameter specifier 
Server certificate public key 
parameter specifier 
Expected Ratio 
10 (nist283r) 3 (nist163r) 
3,10p  
10 (nist283r) 7 (nist233r) 
7,10p  
10 (nist283r) 10 (nist283r) 
10,10p  
Table 3.16 Category#3-Group#3 
 
Using Eq. ( 3.16 ), Eq. ( 3.17 ) and Eq. ( 3.18 ), average services time and the 
second moment of the service time can be interpreted as: 
 
        
( )
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__________ CFINSMCCCSSMCKXSSCCERTSSCHSS TTTTTX
++++
=  
( 3.58 ) 
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2 CFINSMCCCSSMCKXSSCCERTSSCHSS TTTTTX ++++=  
( 3.59 ) 
 
Eq. ( 3.19 ) and Eq. ( 3.20 ) states that: 
 
        10,10,__10,107,10,__7,103,10,__3,10__ CHSSCHSSCHSSCHSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.60 ) 
  
      10,10,__10,107,10,__7,103,10,__3,10__ CCERTSSCCERTSSCCERTSSCCERTSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.61 ) 
  
     10,10,__10,107,10,__7,103,10,__3,10__ CKXSSCKXSSCKXSSCKXSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.62 ) 
  
     10,10,__10,107,10,__7,103,10,__3,10__ CCCSSSCCCSSSCCCSSSCCCSSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.63 ) 
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        10,10,__10,107,10,__7,103,10,__3,10__ CFINSSCFINSSCFINSSCFINSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.64 ) 
  
        110,107,103,10 =++ ppp  ( 3.65 ) 
 
QDT  is computed using Eq. ( 3.12 ). 
 
3.2.7. Category#3-Group#4 – Mutual Authentication 
 
Queue delay model for category#3-group#4 mutual authenticated WTLS full 
handshake will be given in this section. 
 
CA certificate public key 
parameter specifier 
Client/Server certificate public 
key parameter specifier 
Expected Ratio 
22 (RSA3072) 20 (RSA1024) 
20,22p  
22 (RSA3072) 21 (RSA2048) 
21,22p  
22 (RSA3072) 22 (RSA3072) 
22,22p  
Table 3.17 Category#3-Group#4 
 
Using Eq. ( 3.13 ), Eq. ( 3.14 ) and Eq. ( 3.15 ), average services time and the 
second moment of the service time can be interpreted as: 
 
( )
6
____________ CFINSMCCCSSMCERTVRFYSMCKXSMCCERTSMCHSM TTTTTTX
+++++
=  
( 3.66 ) 
  
 ( )
6
__
2
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2
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2
__
2
__
2
__
2
2 CFINSMCCCSSMCERTVRFYSMCKXSMCCERTSMCHSM TTTTTTX
+++++
=  ( 3.67 ) 
 
Eq. ( 3.19 ) and Eq. ( 3.20 ) states that: 
 
  22,22,__22,2221,22,__21,2220,22,__20,22__ CHSMCHSMCHSMCHSM TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.68 ) 
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22,__22,2221,22,__21,2220,22,__20,22__ CCERTSMCCERTSMCCERTSMCCERTSM TpTpTpT ++=
 
( 3.69 ) 
  
 22,22,__22,2221,22,__21,2220,22,__20,22__ CKXSMCKXSMCKXSMCKXSM TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.70 ) 
  
,__22,2221,22,__21,2220,22,__20,22__ CERTVRFYSMCERTVRFYSMCERTVRFYSMCERTVRFYSM TpTpTpT ++=
 
( 3.71 ) 
  
 22,22,__22,2221,22,__21,2220,22,__20,22__ CCCSSMCCCSSMCCCSSMCCCSSM TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.72 ) 
  
22,22,__22,2221,22,__21,2220,22,__20,22__ CFINSMCFINSMCFINSMCFINSM TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.73 ) 
  
        122,2221,2220,22 =++ ppp  ( 3.74 ) 
 
QDT  is computed using Eq. ( 3.12 ). 
 
3.2.8. Category#3-Group#4 – Server Authentication 
 
Queue delay model for category#3-group#4 server authenticated WTLS full 
handshake will be given in this section. 
 
CA certificate public key 
parameter specifier 
Server certificate public key 
parameter specifier 
Expected Ratio 
22 (RSA3072) 20 (RSA1024) 
20,22p  
22 (RSA3072) 21 (RSA2048) 
21,22p  
22 (RSA3072) 22 (RSA3072) 
22,22p  
Table 3.18 Category#3-Group#4 
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Using Eq. ( 3.16 ), Eq. ( 3.17 ) and Eq. ( 3.18 ), average services time and the 
second moment of the service time can be interpreted as: 
 
         
( )
5
__________ CFINSMCCCSSMCKXSSCCERTSSCHSS TTTTTX
++++
=  
( 3.75 ) 
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2 CFINSMCCCSSMCKXSSCCERTSSCHSS TTTTTX ++++=  
( 3.76 ) 
 
Eq. ( 3.19 ) and Eq. ( 3.20 ) states that: 
 
  22,22,__22,2221,22,__21,2220,22,__20,22__ CHSSCHSSCHSSCHSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.77 ) 
  
  22,22,__22,2221,22,__21,2220,22,__20,22__ CCERTSSCCERTSSCCERTSSCCERTSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.78 ) 
  
    22,22,__22,2221,22,__21,2220,22,__20,22__ CKXSSCKXSSCKXSSCKXSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.79 ) 
  
     22,22,__22,2221,22,__21,2220,22,__20,22__ CCCSSSCCCSSSCCCSSSCCCSSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.80 ) 
  
      22,22,__22,2221,22,__21,2220,22,__20,22__ CFINSSCFINSSCFINSSCFINSS TpTpTpT ++=  ( 3.81 ) 
  
        122,2221,2220,22 =++ ppp  ( 3.82 ) 
 
QDT  is computed using Eq. ( 3.12 ). 
 
3.3. Transmission Time Model 
 
Data transmission time is a really complex part of the WTLS handshake protocol 
performance modeling due to the different characteristics of available data bearer types 
and existing of intermediate systems like BTS (Base Transceiver Station), BSC (Base 
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Station Controller), MSC (Mobile Services Switching Center), SGSN (Serving GPRS 
Support Node), GGSN (Gateway GPRS Support Node) etc. servicing between the WAP 
gateway and client. 
 
Typically the data transmission time TDT  can be computed by a simple formula 
given below: 
 
  
R
L
TTD =  
( 3.83 ) 
 
Where; 
 
L  : Data length ( in bits ) 
R  : Channel transmission rate ( bit/s) 
TDT  : Data transmission time 
 
Eq. ( 3.83 ) is not sufficient for the WAP access transmission time computation 
because it does not consider the extra time cost reasoning from the data bearer type. 
Several works on WTP performance over the wireless channel ([40], [41], [42], [43]) 
has shown that the traversal delay of the GSM network is very affective on data 
transmission time.  
 
The WAP architecture requires sending an ACK (acknowledgement) packet to the 
sending peer after receiving a WTP data packet. The time duration between the 
transmission of the data packet and receipt of the ACK packet is defined as RTT 
(Round Trip Time). The RTT value is the most important parameter that must be the 
main consideration of the transmission time modeling. 
 
The RTT value contains the data transmission time in addition to the traversal 
delay of the GSM network. The data transmission time can easily be computed using Eq. 
( 3.83 ). The traversal delay varies for different data bearer types. It may also vary for 
different GSM network providers, traffic load in the current GSM cell, etc. even using 
the same data bearer as stated in [40]. 
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Therefore, overall transmission delay for all of the groups of three categories can 
be modeled as below: 
 
  ( ) traversalTD TmessagesapplicableofnumberR
L
T ´´+= 2  
( 3.84 ) 
 
The meaning of the symbols used in Eq. ( 3.84 ) is given in Table 3.19. 
 
Symbol Meaning 
L  Total data length (in bits) including all the handshake messages and their 
corresponding ACK packets 
R  Channel transmission rate ( bit/s) 
TDT  Data transmission time (s) 
traversalT  One way traversal delay of the GSM network specific to the data bearer 
and GSM service provider 
Table 3.19 Transmission delay modeling formula notations 
 
Two different data bearers have been considered in the data transmission time 
model. These are GSM CSD and GPRS. It is necessary to grasp the architectural 
components that cause the traversal delay in order to clearly understand the reasons of 
this extra cost. Therefore, system architecture for WAP access using GSM CSD, and 
GPRS is discussed below. 
 
A typical GSM CSD network architecture has been given in Figure 3.4. There are 
many GSM network components between the mobile station and the WAP Gateway.  
GSM CSD is a circuit switched data bearer. The mobile station initiates a data call to a 
specified GSM number which is connected to a dial-up modem. This is theoretically the 
same way that a client connects to a RAS (Remote Access Server). Modem pool is 
connected to the WAP Gateway. Therefore, there are many other interfaces between the 
mobile station and the WAP Gateway. Each component’s function is briefly defined 
next. 
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Figure 3.3 GSM CSD network architecture 
 
MS: Mobile station is typically a cellular phone or PDA with GSM capabilities 
 
BTS: The Base Transceiver Station handles the radio interface to the mobile 
station by the means of transceiver and antennas. BTS defines a cell and communicates 
with the clients within its cell. 
 
BSC: The Base Station Controller manages the radio resources for one or more 
BTSs. The BSC establishes the connection between the mobile stations and the Mobile 
Switching Center (MSC). 
 
MSC: The Mobile Services Switching Center manages the telephony switching 
functions. It also handles the mobility management operations. Toll ticketing, network 
interfacing, common channel signaling are other tasks of MSCs. 
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GMSC: The Gateway Mobile Services Switching Center is used to interconnect 
MSCs. 
 
Home Location Register (HLR), Visitor Location Register (VLR), Authentication 
Center (AUC), and Equipment Identity Register (EIR) are the databases that are used for 
the purpose of call control and network management. 
 
Figure 3.4 gives a typical GPRS network system architecture. There are some 
common components with the  GSM CSD network like BTS, BSC, MSC and the 
operational databases. Two new components specific to the GPRS network are Serving 
GPRS Support Node (SGSN), and Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN). 
 
 
Figure 3.4 GPRS network architecture 
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SGSN: The Serving GPRS Support Node routes the packet switched data to and 
from the mobile station. It also performs mobility management, location management, 
logical link management, authentication and charging for calls. 
 
GGSN: The Gateway GPRS Support Node converts the GPRS packets coming 
from the SGSNs into packet data protocol appropriate to the outside data network. Data 
protocol used is usually IP or X.25. Similarly it converts the outside data network 
packets to the GPRS packet format and forwards it to the corresponding SGSN which is 
communicating with the Mobile Station. 
 
System architectures for both GSM CSD and GPRS data bearer types have been 
discussed up to here. It is obvious that there is no direct interface between the mobile 
station and the WAP gateway. WAP architecture requires many format conversions to 
be performed between the architectural components. This is the main reason for the 
network traversal delay. 
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4. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS 
 
Timing measurements were performed using a Nokia Symbian 6.1 [44] phone, 
Nokia 7650, as the client and open source Kannel Gateway [45] running on Cygwin 
[46] as the WAP gateway. Crypto primitives and the WTLS Handshake Protocol [5] 
were implemented using C++. Microsoft Visual Studio 6.0 has been used as the 
development environment for both client and server sides, where Nokia’s Symbian 6.1 
SDK was used to build the code for the ARM [47] processor of Nokia 7650. The 
gateway (server) operating system was Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server SP4 
running on an Intel P4 2.4 GHz CPU and 1GB DDR RAM. 
 
Three main factors on WTLS Handshake Protocol performance are considered. 
These are: 
i. Processing time at both client and server 
ii. Server queue waiting time 
iii. Handshake data transmission time over the GSM network 
 
Client and server processing time model is given at Section 3.1. Processing time 
for each handshake message appropriate to the selected handshake suite must be 
measured to compute the overall handshake processing time PDT . Each handshake suite 
has been performed for 15 times during the tests and the arithmetic mean of these 15 
different values has been recorded as the average processing time for the corresponding 
handshake message. 24 different cases for both mutual authenticated and server 
authenticated WTLS handshake have been performed and the measured timing values 
were used to compute the overall processing time for client ( CPDT _ ) and server ( SPDT _ ). 
Detailed analysis of client and server processing time for a total of 48 test cases has 
been given in Section 4.1. 
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Server queue delay model is given at Section 3.2. The server is modeled as an 
M/G/1 queue and the average waiting time QDT for a key exchange suite can be 
computed using ( 3.12 ). Server queue waiting time is strictly dependent on the average 
processing time of each handshake message in the selected key exchange suite. The 
queue delay model in conjunction with the measured timing values has been used to 
compute QDT . Computations were done using Matlab 6.0 and analyzed in Section 4.2. 
 
The data transmission delay TDT  model is given in Section 3.3. TDT  has been 
computed by subtracting the total processing time PDT  from the measured overall 
handshake time. Then using the transmission delay model, the GSM service provider’s 
traversal delay traversalT  has been computed for the selected data bearer. Data 
transmission delay analysis is given in Section 4.3. 
 
4.1. Processing Time Analysis 
 
Processing times of the client side and the server side has been measured for 24 
mutual authenticated and 24 server authenticated WTLS handshake test cases. Each test 
case differs by the CA certificate public key parameter specifier and the peers’ 
certificate public key parameter specifier. These test cases are in fact the three 
categories defined in Section 3. Mutual authenticated WTLS handshake processing 
times are given in Table 4.1 and server authenticated WTLS handshake processing 
times are given in Table 4.2. Processing time analysis has been done using the timing 
values given in these two tables and corresponding figures generated using these timing 
values. 
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Category# 
 
 
Group# CA Cert. 
Client /Server 
Cert. 
Client 
Processing 
Time(ms) 
Server 
Processing 
Time(ms) 
1 160p 160p 745.65 10.57 
2 163k 163k 502.74 24.48 
3 163r 163r 489.01 24.01 
1 
 
 4 rsa1024 rsa1024 3780.40 45.86 
224p 160p 1477.19 18.66 1 
224p 224p 1860.47 22.52 
233k 163k 733.85 36.85 2 
233k 233k 886.93 43.61 
233r 163r 758.14 38.04 3 
233r 233r 885.57 46.11 
rsa2048 rsa1024 5192.50 60.52 
2 
 
 
 
4 
rsa2048 rsa2048 23567.50 264.69 
256p 160p 2071.71 27.46 
256p 224p 2441.38 29.55 
 
1 
256p 256p 2730.20 33.04 
283k 163k 1207.24 58.48 
283k 233k 1320.61 65.16 
 
2 
283k 283k 1552.83 75.92 
283r 163r 1293.13 60.90 
283r 233r 1372.31 67.33 
 
3 
283r 283r 1632.93 78.63 
rsa3072 rsa1024 7678.87 78.40 
rsa3072 rsa2048 26239.86 298.91 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
rsa3072 rsa3072 74109.11 891.53 
Table 4.1 Mutual  authenticated WTLS handshake overall processing times 
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Category# 
 
 
Group# CA Cert. Server Cert. 
Client 
Processing 
Time(ms) 
Server 
Processing 
Time(ms) 
1 160p 160p 738.95 3.85 
2 163k 163k 501.89 8.42 
3 163r 163r 485.63 12.51 
1 
 
 4 rsa1024 rsa1024 1006.78 36.99 
224p 160p 1451.11 3.68 1 
224p 224p 1853.71 7.90 
233k 163k 724.86 8.77 2 
233k 233k 861.78 14.70 
233r 163r 759.96 9.31 3 
233r 233r 884.06 26.76 
rsa2048 rsa1024 2451.88 37.80 
2 
 
 
 
4 
rsa2048 rsa2048 3925.60 240.39 
256p 160p 2079.21 3.73 
256p 224p 2470.75 7.97 
 
1 
256p 256p 2742.43 11.48 
283k 163k 1206.30 8.50 
283k 233k 1308.86 15.44 
 
2 
283k 283k 1552.11 25.86 
283r 163r 1286.09 8.41 
283r 233r 1368.78 15.61 
 
3 
283r 283r 1625.03 26.67 
rsa3072 rsa1024 4935.73 38.37 
rsa3072 rsa2048 6396.90 244.18 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
rsa3072 rsa3072 8815.48 871.41 
Table 4.2 Server authenticated WTLS handshake overall processing times 
 
Analyzing the processing times for the category#1, server processing times are 
always lower than the client processing times as an expected result. Category#1-
group3(163 bit random curve) client side processing time is the lowest one among the 
others for both server authenticated and mutual authenticated WTLS handshake. 163 bit 
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Koblitz curve is on the second and the 160 bit prime curve is the worst case for the 
ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites of Category#1 client side processing times. 
Group#4(RSA 1024) key exchange is significantly slower when compared to the 
ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites in the same category. Server authenticated WTLS 
handshake client processing time for the group#4 (RSA key exchange using 1024 bit 
public key) is 1006.78 ms, where it is 485.63 ms for the group#3 (ECDH_ECDSA key 
exchange using 163 bit random curve). Mutual authenticated WTLS handshake client 
processing time for the group#4 is 3780.4 ms and it is 489.01 ms for the group#3. 
Comparing the results for category#1 processing times of server authenticated and 
mutual authenticated handshakes, it is clear tha t the ECDH_ECDSA key exchange 
client processing times increase a little for the mutual authenticated WTLS handshake. 
On the other hand, group#4 key exchange client processing time significantly increases 
from 1006.78 ms to 3780.4 ms for the mutual authenticated WTLS handshake. 
 
Measurements show that the processing times of category#1 behave different for 
the server side. ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites’ processing times are always lower 
than the RSA key exchange but surprisingly the 160 bit prime curve which is the worst 
case for the client side performs better than the other ECC curves for the server side. 
Group#2 and group#3 server processing times are almost equal for the server 
authenticated WTLS handshake, where group#2 performs 50% better than group#3 for 
the mutual authenticated WTLS handshake. Another interesting concern is that the ratio 
of the server side processing times for the server authenticated WTLS handshake is 
significantly different. ECDH_ECDSA key exchange using 160 bit prime curve 
performs in a total processing time of 3.85 ms, where 163 bit Koblitz curve performs in 
8.42 ms, 163 bit random curve performs in 12.51 ms and 1024 bit RSA key exchange 
suite performs in 36.99 ms. The ratios of the group#2(163 bit Koblitz curve), 
group#3(163 bit random curve) and group#4(1024 bit RSA) processing times over 
group#1(160 bit prime curve) processing time are 2.18, 3.24 and 9.6 respectively. The 
ratios of the processing times are not that much for the client side. The same rule also 
applies for the mutual authenticated WTLS handshake with the following ratios 2.31, 
2.27 and 4.33 respectively. 
 
73 
Category#1 client processing times and server processing times for mutual 
authenticated and server authenticated WTLS handshake cases are given in Figure 4.1 
and Figure 4.2. 
 
Client processing times for category#1 ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites of 
mutual authenticated and server authenticated WTLS handshakes are almost equal, 
where the RSA key exchange suite processing time significantly increases for the 
mutual authenticated WLS handshake as seen in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Category#1 client processing times 
 
Server processing times for category#1 mutual authenticated WTLS handshake 
are significantly higher then the server authenticated WTLS handshake groups’ 
processing times. Server authenticated and mutual authenticated handshake processing 
times are compared in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 Category#1 server processing times 
 
Category#2 mutual authenticated and server authenticated WTLS handshakes 
client and server processing times are given in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 respectively. 
 
Category#2 processing times have similar characteristic with category#1 but there 
are also some slight changes. Generally speaking, group#4 (RSA key exchange suites) 
handshakes always have more processing time when compared to the ECDH_ECDSA 
ones. Comparing the certificates that offer the same level of security, the key exchange 
suite that uses client certificate with 163 bit Koblitz curve parameters signed with 233 
bit Koblitz curve private key has the lowest client processing time, where the client 
certificate with 160 bit prime curve parameters signed with 224 bit prime curve private 
key has the highest client processing time. Group#1 always has the highest client 
processing times for both server authenticated and mutual authenticated WTLS 
handshake. Meanwhile the client processing time when using client certificate with 233 
bit random curve parameters signed with 233 bit random curve private key has only a 
little more client processing time when compared to the client certificate with 233 bit 
Koblitz parameters. Client processing time significantly increases when peers have 
certificates that use 2048 bit RSA public key. 
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Figure 4.3 Category#2 client processing times 
 
Similar to the category#1 handshakes, category#2 handshakes have the lowest 
server processing times when using ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites with prime 
curve parameters. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Categor y#2 server processing times 
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Category#3 mutual authenticated and server authenticated WTLS handshakes 
client and server processing times are given in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Category#3 client processing times 
Client processing times of category#3-group#4(RSA) handshakes always has the 
highest value, where the group#2 (Koblitz curves) handshakes have the lowest client 
processing times. Group#1 (prime curves) have the highest client processing time 
among the other ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites. 
 
Server processing times of category#3-group#1(prime curves) has the lowest 
value as it is the same case for category#1 and category#2 server processing times. 
Server processing time with RSA 3072 bit public key certificates has the highest value. 
It is also interesting that the server processing time has significantly high value for both 
mutual authenticate and server authenticated WTLS handshake. 
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Figure 4.6 Category#3 server processing times 
 
Comparison of the client and sever processing times for both mutual authenticated 
and server authenticated WTLS handshakes has been given up to here. A more detailed 
analysis that gives the processing time percentage for each handshake message fo r a 
given category and group is given next. 
 
Mutual authenticated WTLS handshake ECDH_ECDSA and RSA key exchange 
suites client processing time percentages are given in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. It is 
obviously seen that there are two main operations for ECDH_ECDSA key exchange 
suites and three main operations for RSA key exchange suites. SCERTCMT __  is 65%-87% 
of overall client processing time and CKXCMT __  is 11%-34% of overall client processing 
time for ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites. This shows that two main handshake 
messages for ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites are ClientKeyExchange and 
Certificate verification. ECDH operation is performed to compute the premaster secret. 
Generation and processing of ClientKeyExchange message requires two operations one 
which is ECDH operation in ECDHCMT __  ms and the other is computing the master 
secret from the premaster secret in MSCMT __  ms. Measurements show that the ECDH 
operation gets more than 99% of ClientKeyExchange message processing time 
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CKXCMT __ . Verifying the server certificate using the CA certificate and the ECDH 
operation to compute the premaster secret are the two main operations that constitute 
more than 98% of overall client processing time. Processing times for other handshake 
messages seem to be negligible for the client side. 
 
Considering the mutual authenticated RSA key exchange suites, we see three 
handshake messages ClientKeyExchange, Server.Certificate and CertificateVerify that 
have client processing time percentage of 13%-6%, 6%-57% and 35%-88% respectively. 
These three messages’ client processing time constitutes more than 99% of the overall 
client processing time and the other processing times can be neglected. 
CertificateVerify message includes a private key operation, CERTVRFYCMT __ has the 
biggest portion of the client processing time. ClientKeyExchange message processing 
includes two main operations, the first one is the encryption of the premaster secret 
using the server’s public key and the second operation is computing the master secret 
from the premaster secret. The public key encryption time RSAENCCMT __  gets more than 
99% of ClientKeyExchange message processing time CKXCMT __ . Therefore, we can say 
that three main operations that form 99% of client processing time when using RSA key 
exchange suites are verifying the server certificate using the CA certificate in 
SCERTCMT __ , encrypting the premaster secret using the server certificate in RSAENCCMT __  
ms and finally signing the hash value of the previous handshake messages using the 
client private key in CERTVRFYCMT __  ms. 
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CA 
Cert. 
Client 
Cert. Others CKXCMT __  CKXCM
ECDHCM
T
T
__
__  
CKXCM
MSCM
T
T
__
__  
SCERTCMT __  
160p 160p 1.24 33.38 99.66 0.34 65.38 
224p 160p 0.20 16.24 99.67 0.33 83.56 
224p 224p 1.02 33.48 99.85 0.15 65.51 
256p 160p 0.40 11.86 99.67 0.33 87.74 
256p 224p 0.36 24.99 99.86 0.14 74.65 
256p 256p 0.38 32.57 99.91 0.09 67.05 
163k 163k 1.81 32.92 99.47 0.53 65.27 
233k 163k 1.57 21.17 99.42 0.58 77.26 
233k 233k 0.91 33.69 99.71 0.29 65.40 
283k 163k 0.51 12.66 99.44 0.56 86.83 
283k 233k 0.64 20.80 99.68 0.32 78.56 
283k 283k 0.92 32.67 99.83 0.17 66.41 
163r 163r 1.50 31.62 99.45 0.55 66.89 
233r 163r 1.20 21.11 99.49 0.51 77.68 
233r 233r 0.68 31.79 99.70 0.30 67.53 
283r 163r 0.84 12.50 99.48 0.52 86.65 
283r 233r 0.48 20.88 99.72 0.28 78.64 
283r 283r 0.76 32.79 99.83 0.17 66.45 
Table 4.3 Mutual authenticated WTLS handshake ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites client 
processing time percentages 
 
CA 
Cert. 
Server 
Cert. Others CKXCMT __  CKXCM
MSCM
T
T
__
__  
CKXCM
RSAENCCM
T
T
__
__  
SCERTCMT __  CERTVRFYCMT __  
rsa1024 rsa1024 0.26 13.20 0.17 99.83 13.20 73.34 
rsa2048 rsa1024 0.38 9.65 0.19 99.81 37.61 52.36 
rsa2048 rsa2048 0.02 8.23 0.05 99.95 8.29 83.47 
rsa3072 rsa1024 0.17 6.51 0.19 99.81 57.33 35.99 
rsa3072 rsa2048 0.05 7.50 0.04 99.96 16.75 75.71 
Rsa3072 rsa3072 0.02 5.97 0.02 99.98 5.94 88.08 
Table 4.4 Mutual authenticated WTLS handshake RSA key exchange suites client processing 
time percentages 
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Figure 4.7 gives the change in percentages of ECDH operation processing times, 
and verification of server certificate processing times of the selected ECDH key 
exchange suites for the client side. It is obviously seen that the processing time 
percentage of ECDH operation increases as larger keys are used. CA certificate public 
key type and the CA public key size are common for a given category. Therefore, 
verification of the server certificate always requires the same key public key size to be 
used. Thus the certificate verification operation processing time changes slightly as 
larger keys are used. On the other hand, ECDH operation client processing time 
percentage increases as larger keys are used for the mutual authenticated WTLS full 
handshake. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Client processing time percentages of mutual authenticated ECDH key exchange 
 
Mutual authenticated WTLS full handshake client processing time percentage 
changes of RSA encryption, generation of certificate verify message and verification of 
server certificate are given in Figure 4.8. RSA encryption client processing time 
percentage changes slightly while the percentage of the private key operation to 
generate the certificate verify message significantly increases as larger keys are used. 
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Figure 4.8 Client processing time percentages of mutual authenticated RSA key exchange 
 
Mutual authenticated WTLS handshake ECDH_ECDSA and RSA key exchange 
suites server processing time percentages are given in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6. Similar 
to the client processing times for ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites, ECDHSMT __  and 
CCERTSMT __  constitute more than 95% of the server processing times for mutual 
authenticated WTLS handshake. Computing the premaster secret by performing the 
ECDH operation, and verification of the client certificate are two main components of 
the server processing time for the mutual authenticated ECDH key exchange. 
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CA 
Cert. 
Client 
Cert. Others CKXSMT __  CKXSM
ECDHSM
T
T
__
__  
CKXSM
MSSM
T
T
__
__  
CCERTSMT __  
160p 160p 4.40 31.93 98.58 1.28 63.67 
224p 160p 2.53 16.59 98.58 1.30 80.88 
224p 224p 2.07 32.43 99.35 0.60 65.51 
256p 160p 1.73 11.71 98.46 1.41 86.56 
256p 224p 1.64 25.13 99.35 0.60 73.23 
256p 256p 1.51 33.00 99.52 0.44 65.49 
163k 163k 1.91 32.30 99.34 0.60 65.79 
233k 163k 1.31 22.39 99.32 0.63 76.30 
233k 233k 1.11 32.74 99.63 0.34 66.15 
283k 163k 0.84 13.52 99.33 0.62 85.63 
283k 233k 0.74 22.99 99.63 0.34 76.27 
283k 283k 0.63 33.34 99.79 0.20 66.02 
163r 163r 1.91 32.22 99.39 0.56 65.87 
233r 163r 1.23 20.89 99.35 0.59 77.88 
233r 233r 1.04 33.60 99.67 0.30 65.36 
283r 163r 0.77 12.90 99.29 0.65 86.33 
283r 233r 0.76 22.50 99.65 0.32 76.74 
283r 283r 0.62 33.13 99.76 0.22 66.26 
Table 4.5 Mutual authenticated WTLS handshake ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites 
server processing time percentages 
 
Processing time percentages of the ECDH operation increase when larger keys are 
used for a given category as shown in Figure 4.9. 
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Figure 4.9 Server processing time percentages of mutual authenticated ECDH key exchange 
 
Server processing times for the RSA key exchange suites behave different than 
the client side. There are again three main components, ClientKeyExchange message 
processing in CKXSMT __  ms, verification of the client certificate in CCERTSMT __  ms and 
CERTVRFYSMT __  in ms. CKXSMT __  has 64%-92% of overall server processing time, 
CERTVRFYSMT __  and CCERTSMT __  is 4%-42% and 4%-10% of overall server processing 
time. It is seen that the verification of CertificateVerify message does not have such a 
big affect on server processing time as it does for the client side, but it is still one of 
three messages to consider for the mutual authenticated WTLS handshake server 
processing time. Server processing time percentages for the most significant 
cryptographic operations are given in Figure 4.10. 
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CA 
Cert. 
Server 
Cert. Others CKXSMT __  CKXSM
MSSM
T
T
__
__  
CKXSM
RSADECSM
T
T
__
__  
CCERTSMT __  CERTVRFYSMT __  
rsa1024 rsa1024 1.47 79.28 0.14 99.84 9.63 9.62 
rsa2048 rsa1024 1.17 64.03 0.15 99.83 27.07 7.72 
rsa2048 rsa2048 0.36 87.38 0.02 99.97 6.14 6.13 
rsa3072 rsa1024 0.97 47.36 0.14 99.84 46.02 5.65 
rsa3072 rsa2048 0.33 81.88 0.02 99.97 12.25 5.54 
rsa3072 rsa3072 0.13 91.68 0.01 99.99 4.11 4.08 
Table 4.6 Mutual authenticated WTLS handshake RSA key exchange suites server 
processing time percentages 
 
 
Figure 4.10 Server processing time percentages of mutual authenticated RSA key exchange 
 
Server authenticated WTLS handshake client processing times for 
ECDH_ECDSA and RSA key exchange suites are given in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 
respectively. Similar to the mutual authenticated WTLS handshake client processing 
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times, the ECDH operation and verification of the server certificate are two affective 
operations that constitute more than 98% of the client processing time. Namely 
ECDHCST __  and SCERTCST __  are the most important two components of the server 
processing time for server authenticated ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites. 
 
Server authenticated RSA key exchange suites do not use the CertificateVerify 
message as it is the case for the mutual authenticated WTLS handshake. Two main 
components of the client processing time for the server authenticated WTLS handshake 
are encrypting the premaster secret in RSAENCCST __  ms and verifying the server 
certificate in CCERTCST __  ms. 
 
Client processing time percentages of the most significant handshake operations 
for the server authenticated ECDH key exchange suites are given in Figure 4.11. 
 
 
Figure 4.11 Client processing time percentages of server authenticated ECDH key exchange 
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Client processing time percentages of the most significant handshake operations 
for the server authenticated RSA key exchange suites are given in Figure 4.12. 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Client processing time percentages of mutual authenticated RSA key exchange 
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CA 
Cert. 
Server 
Cert. Others CKXCST __  CKXCS
ECDHCS
T
T
__
__  
CKXCS
MSCS
T
T
__
__  
SCERTCST __  
160p 160p 1.13 33.11 99.66 0.34 65.76 
224p 160p 0.46 16.49 99.66 0.34 83.05 
224p 224p 0.48 33.25 99.87 0.13 66.26 
256p 160p 0.37 11.84 99.66 0.34 87.78 
256p 224p 0.35 25.03 99.86 0.14 74.62 
256p 256p 0.35 32.50 99.91 0.09 67.15 
163k 163k 2.09 32.90 99.48 0.52 65.01 
233k 163k 0.90 21.36 99.44 0.56 77.74 
233k 233k 0.65 32.11 99.71 0.29 67.24 
283k 163k 0.95 12.57 99.42 0.58 86.49 
283k 233k 0.45 20.85 99.68 0.32 78.70 
283k 283k 0.60 32.82 99.80 0.20 66.59 
163r 163r 2.22 31.62 99.41 0.59 66.16 
233r 163r 0.67 21.20 99.49 0.51 78.13 
233r 233r 0.55 31.84 99.70 0.30 67.60 
283r 163r 0.59 12.54 99.48 0.52 86.87 
283r 233r 0.71 20.85 99.71 0.29 78.44 
283r 283r 0.56 32.89 99.84 0.16 66.55 
Table 4.7 Server authenticated WTLS handshake ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites client 
processing time percentages 
 
CA 
Cert. 
Server 
Cert. Others CKXCST __  CKXCS
MSCS
T
T
__
__  
CKXCS
RSAENCCS
T
T
__
__  
SCERTCST __  
rsa1024 rsa1024 1.23 49.47 0.17 99.83 49.30 
rsa2048 rsa1024 0.41 20.29 0.18 99.82 79.30 
rsa2048 rsa2048 0.35 49.87 0.04 99.96 49.78 
rsa3072 rsa1024 0.22 10.13 0.20 99.80 89.66 
rsa3072 rsa2048 0.15 30.83 0.05 99.95 69.02 
rsa3072 rsa3072 0.10 50.05 0.02 99.98 49.85 
Table 4.8 Server authenticated WTLS handshake RSA key exchange suites client processing 
time percentages 
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Server processing times for Server authenticated WTLS handshake using 
ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites have only one  main component. That is the ECDH 
operation performed in ECDHSST __  ms. Server processing time percentages of the 
handshake messages for server authenticated WTLS handshake are given in Table 4.9. 
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CA 
Cert. 
Server 
Cert. Others CKXSST __  CKXSS
ECDHSS
T
T
__
__  
CKXSS
MSSS
T
T
__
__  
160p 160p 11.81 88.19 98.32 1.48 
224p 160p 12.41 87.59 98.30 1.51 
224p 224p 6.10 93.90 99.21 0.69 
256p 160p 12.31 87.69 98.21 1.58 
256p 224p 5.95 94.05 99.22 0.68 
256p 256p 4.11 95.89 99.46 0.47 
163k 163k 5.33 94.67 99.28 0.64 
233k 163k 5.15 94.85 99.32 0.60 
233k 233k 3.20 96.80 99.60 0.35 
283k 163k 5.53 94.47 99.29 0.62 
283k 233k 3.06 96.94 99.61 0.34 
283k 283k 1.84 98.16 99.77 0.20 
163r 163r 4.51 95.49 99.36 0.57 
233r 163r 5.06 94.94 99.33 0.59 
233r 233r 2.33 97.67 99.67 0.30 
283r 163r 5.45 94.55 99.28 0.62 
283r 233r 3.02 96.98 99.60 0.34 
283r 283r 1.83 98.17 99.77 0.20 
Table 4.9 Server authenticated WTLS handshake ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites server 
processing time percentages 
 
Server processing time percentages of individual handshake messages for server 
authenticated WTLS handshake using RSA key exchange suites are given in Table 4.10. 
It is obvious that the decryption of the premaster secret using the server private key is 
the biggest portion of the server processing time. 
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CA 
Cert. 
Server 
Cert Others CKXSST __  CKXSS
MSSS
T
T
__
__  
CKXSS
RSADECSS
T
T
__
__  
rsa1024 rsa1024 1.71 98.29 0.14 99.84 
rsa2048 rsa1024 1.83 98.17 0.14 99.84 
rsa2048 rsa2048 0.42 99.58 0.03 99.96 
rsa3072 rsa1024 1.88 98.12 0.15 99.83 
rsa3072 rsa2048 0.42 99.58 0.02 99.97 
rsa3072 rsa3072 0.16 99.84 0.01 99.99 
Table 4.10 Server authenticated WTLS handshake RSA key exchange suites client 
processing time percentages 
 
4.2. Queue Delay Analysis 
 
Mutual authenticated and server authenticated WTLS handshake server queue 
delay analysis for Category#3 key exchange suites have been given in this section. The 
queue delay model is given in Section 3.2. The queue delay model has been 
implemented in Matlab 6.0 and the measured timing values have been used to generate 
the estimated server queue delays. 
 
The queue delay strictly depends on the server processing time of the 
corresponding handshake messages. Server processing times for each category has been 
analyzed in Section 4.1. All of the four groups of category#3 include three possible key 
exchange suites with corresponding ratios. Five different ratios have been considered 
during the queue delay analysis. The upper limit for the arrival rate of the handshake 
requests is 100 handshake requests per second. Legends in all queue delay figures are in 
ascending order of queue delay performance from up to down. 
 
Server queue delays for category#3-group#1 key exchange suites have been given 
in Figure 4.13. The utilization of the server does not reach to 1 for any of the considered 
five ratios. The key exchange suite using client/server certificates with 160 bit prime 
curve parameters signed by CA certificate with 256 bit prime curve parameters have the 
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highest queue waiting delay because this case has the highest processing time among 
the other cases. On the other hand, the server queue delay is in acceptable ranges for 
any of the considered cases. 
 
 
Figure 4.13 Category#3-Group#1 server queue delays(mutual authentication) 
 
Server queue delays for category#3-group#2 key exchange suites have been given 
in Figure 4.14. Average server processing time increases for the group#2 key exchange 
suites which contain certificates with Koblitz curve parameters. Average server queue 
waiting time increases up to 150-160 ms for 72 handshake requests per second. The 
utilization of the server is equal to 1 for the systems with arrival rate higher than 72. 
Therefore, 72 is the practical upper limit when category#3-group2 key exchange suites 
are used. The server queue waiting time asymptotically increases after 72 handshake 
requests per second. 
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Figure 4.14 Category#3-Group#2 server queue delays(mutual authentication) 
 
 
Figure 4.15 Category#3-Group#3 server queue delays(mutual authentication) 
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Figure 4.15 shows the server queue delays for category#3-group#3 key exchange 
suites. Similar to the group#2, 72 handshake requests per second is the upper limit for 
those types of systems and the queue waiting time goes up to 230 ms for the worst case. 
 
Server queue waiting times for category#3-group4 is much more interesting then 
the other groups. Group#4 contains RSA certificates. As an expected result the case 
with the lowest processing time must have the lowest server queue waiting time. Queue 
delays for category#3-group4 key exchange suites with different ratios are given in 
Figure 4.16.  
 
 
Figure 4.16 Category#3-Group#4 server queue delays(mutual authentication) 
 
Client/server certificates containing 1024 bit RSA public key signed by CA 3072 
bit RSA certificate is the best option to use. This case has 71 handshake requests per 
second as an upper limit with the queue waiting time around 146 ms. The case with 
50% RSA 1024 certificates and the remaining 50% RSA 2048 certificates is the second 
case that has a good queue waiting delay characteristics. The upper limit for the 
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handshake requests arrival rate is 25 with an average queue waiting time of 165 ms. As 
the ratio of the RSA 3072 client/server certificates increase, the upper limit for the 
handshake requests arrival rate decreases and comes to an un acceptable level for the 
case, where all the client/server certificates have 3072 bit RSA public key. The server 
can not serve more than one handshake request per second in an acceptable queue 
waiting time range. This is because of the extremely high server processing times when 
certificates with 3072 bit RSA public key are used. 
 
A comparison of the category#3 groups’ server queue delay values have been 
given for selected ratios in Figure 4.17, Figure 4.18 and Figure 4.19. Group#2, group#3 
and group#4 key exchange suites have similar queue delay characteristics, where the 
group#1 is significantly better for both average queue waiting time and the upper limit 
for the arrival rate of handshake requests per second for the first case in Figure 4.17. 
Members of the groups that are compared offer the same level of security. This shows 
that certificates with 160 bit prime curve parameters have a better queue delay 
performance when compared to 163 bit Koblitz curve, 163 bit random curve or 1024 bit 
RSA. More than a better server queue waiting time, prime curve systems do not have 
bottleneck reasoning from the queue delays, where the other alternatives can not serve 
more than 70 handshake request per second on the average. 
 
Figure 4.18 compares the queue delay characteristics of the category#3 groups 
with 224 bit prime curve, 233 bit Koblitz curve, 233 bit random curve and 2048 bit 
RSA. ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites’ queue delay characteristics change slightly, 
where the RSA key exchange suite has a significant change that it can serve a maximum 
of 14 handshake requests per second with a 180 ms queue delay for the worst case. The 
queue delay grows asymptotically for arrival rates bigger than 14 handshake requests 
per second. 
 
Wee can see the more dramatic change of server queue delay characteristics in 
Figure 4.19 when using certificates with 3072 bit RSA certificates. Use of 3072 bit RSA 
certificates seems like not practical to offer the same level of security using ECC 
certificates with 256 bit prime curve, 283 bit Koblitz curve or 283 bit random curve 
parameters. 
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Figure 4.17 Category#3 groups server queue delays-1 (mutual authentication) 
 
 
Figure 4.18 Category#3 groups server queue delays-2 (mutual authentication) 
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Figure 4.19 Category#3 groups server queue delays-3 (mutual authentication) 
 
Server queue delays for server authenticated WTLS handshake key exchange 
suites will be analyzed next. Server queue delays for ECDH_ECDSA key exchange 
suites of group#1, group#2 and group#3 are given in Figure 4.20, Figure 4.21 and 
Figure 4.22 respectively. It is no use to analyze the server queue delay in detail for 
different ratios of ECC certificates for server authenticated WTLS handshake because 
the average waiting time is extremely small for all the cases (with a degree of ms510-  ). 
This is due to the low processing times of ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites at the 
server side. 
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Figure 4.20 Category#3-Group#1 server queue delays(server authentication) 
 
 
Figure 4.21 Category#3-Group#2 server queue delays(server authentication) 
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Figure 4.22 Category#3-Group#3 server queue delays(server authentication) 
 
It is not the same perfect case as in ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites for the 
server authenticated WTLS handshake when using RSA key exchange suites. Figure 
4.23 shows the average queue delays for category#3-group4 key exchange suites. The 
server queue delay behavior of group#4 is similar to the case in the mutual 
authenticated WTLS handshake but with a better performance. Server certificate 
containing 1024 bit RSA certificate has the best queue delay performance. The queue 
delay is extremely low when compared to other alternatives. The case with 50% RSA 
1024 certificates and 50% RSA 2048 certificates can serve 33 handshake requests per 
second with the average queue delay of 620 ms for the worst case. The queue delay 
asymptotically increases for a higher arrival rates. As an expected result, the case that 
uses purely 3072 bit RSA server certificates has the worst queue delay performance. 
Such a system has an upper limit of 6 requests per second with a queue delay of 3000 
ms for the worst case. 
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Figure 4.23 Category#3-Group#4 server queue delays(server authentication) 
 
As a general result, the server queue delay becomes a really big bottleneck for 
both server authenticated and mutual authenticated WTLS handshakes as the server side 
processing time increases. 
 
4.3. Data Transmission Time Analysis 
 
Data transmission time analysis has been performed for two data bearer systems. 
These are GSM CSD (Global System for Mobile Communication Circuit Switched 
Data) and GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) data bearers. Tests have been 
performed using the GSM CSD data bearer. In this way, measured data transmission 
times have been given and the average traversal delay for this bearer type has been 
computed. WTLS handshake protocol could not be run over GPRS bearer because of 
GSM service provider restrictions  on the use of GPRS. Therefore, traversal delay for the 
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GPRS bearer has been measured by using a different testbed which is detailed in 
Section 4.3.2. 
 
The corresponding data size (in bits) of each key exchange suite tested has been 
given in Table 4.11. 
 
CA Cert. 
Client/Server 
Cert. 
Mutual Authentication 
Data Size 
Server Authentication 
Data Size 
160p 160p 1515 1362 
163k 163k 1519 1366 
163r 163r 1519 1366 
rsa1024 rsa1024 2231 1522 
224p 160p 1543 1376 
224p 224p 1575 1408 
233k 163k 1551 1382 
233k 233k 1587 1418 
233r 163r 1555 1384 
233r 233r 1591 1420 
rsa2048 rsa1024 2487 1650 
rsa2048 rsa2048 2999 1906 
256p 160p 1559 1384 
256p 224p 1591 1416 
256p 256p 1607 1432 
283k 163k 1579 1396 
283k 233k 1615 1432 
283k 283k 1639 1456 
283r 163r 1579 1396 
283r 233r 1615 1432 
283r 283r 1639 1456 
rsa3072 rsa1024 2743 1778 
rsa3072 rsa2048 3255 2034 
rsa3072 rsa3072 3767 2290 
Table 4.11 Total data sizes for selected test cases (bytes) 
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4.3.1. Data Transmission Time Analysis for GSM CSD Bearer 
 
Data transmission time has been computed by subtracting the total processing 
time for both peers from the overall handshake time. Data transmission time model was 
given in Section 3.3. Using the measured timing values, traversal delay of the test 
network can be found from Eq. ( 3.84 ). 
 
  ( ) traversalTD TmessagesapplicableofnumberR
L
T ´´+= 2  
( 3.84 ) 
 
GSM CSD data rate is 9600 bps. So; 
 
bpsL 9600=  
 
Measured data transmission times for each test case have been given in Table 4.12. 
Therefore, we can compute the average traversal delay for the GSM CSD bearer. 
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CA Cert. 
Client/Server 
Cert. AUTHMUTUALTDT __  AUTHSERVERTDT __  
160p 160p 4913.392 4952.402 
163k 163k 4881.769 4722.283 
163r 163r 5058.279 4924.011 
rsa1024 rsa1024 5211.954 4344.448 
224p 160p 5121.961 5093.972 
224p 224p 4961.851 5105.81 
233k 163k 4851.545 4962.061 
233k 233k 4851.896 4989.211 
233r 163r 4942.727 5083.323 
233r 233r 4880.029 5047.458 
rsa2048 rsa1024 5033.226 4522.1 
rsa2048 rsa2048 5063.435 5204.466 
256p 160p 5121.502 5164.236 
256p 224p 4906.531 5144.932 
256p 256p 5242.198 5133.612 
283k 163k 5164.529 4930.2 
283k 233k 5247.338 4926.873 
283k 283k 5054.285 5138.207 
283r 163r 5039.547 4905.654 
283r 233r 6750.748 5023.451 
283r 283r 4966.507 5451.005 
rsa3072 rsa1024 5149.138 4499.576 
rsa3072 rsa2048 5327.293 5103.475 
rsa3072 rsa3072 5008.471 4930.346 
Table 4.12 Transmission delays for GSM CSD bearer (ms) 
 
Number of applicable messages is given below: 
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All the values needed have been given up to here, then Eq. ( 4.1 ) can be used to 
compute the traversal delays. 
 
  ( )messagesapplicableofnumber
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L
T
T
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ø
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ç
è
æ -
=  
 
( 4.1 ) 
 
Eq. ( 4.1 ) has been implemented in Matlab 6.0 and traversalT  was found with the 
following properties: 
Expected value of  traversalT  = 391.3 ms 
Standard deviation of  traversalT  = 90 ms 
 
Average number of applicable messages is 5 for the selected handshake types. 
Round Trip Time (RTT) of a handshake message includes transmission of the 
corresponding ACK packets. Therefore, the average number of packets that traverse 
through the network is twice the number of handshake messages. The overall data 
transmission delay TDT  is 5042.8 ms on the average, approximately 
msx 3913103.391 =  of the average transmission delay comes from the 
traversal delay of the GSM network for the selected data bearer type GSM CSD. The 
transmission delay coming from the traversal delays of the network is %76  of the 
overall data transmission time on the average. This shows that the number of handshake 
messages for a given key exchange suite is more significant  than the data size, on the 
overall handshake duration for GSM CSD data bearer systems. 
 
4.3.2. Data Transmission Time Analysis for GPRS Bearer 
 
Data transmission time for the GPRS bearer is predicted analytically by using the 
timing data gathered from the performance tests over GPRS bearer. Figure 4.24 
represents the testbed used. We need to investigate the data rates for download (from 
server to client) and upload (form client to server) operations, and traversal delay of the 
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GPRS network. 7 different time slots are selected to perform the tests. These are 12 PM, 
2 PM, 4 PM, 6 PM, 8 PM, 10 PM, and 12 AM. Data rates and network traversal delays 
are measured at these hours. Dial-up networking monitor v2.1 program is used to get 
the data rate information. A test file of 500 KB size is uploaded to and downloaded 
from a server on Internet to learn the data rates. Then the ping program is used to learn 
the RTT values. Traversal delay is computed by using the data transmission rates and 
RTT values. Performance tests are explained in detail below. 
 
500 KB test file is uploaded to the Internet server and the average upload data rate 
is measured for each selected time slot. The same test file is downloaded from the 
Internet server and the average download rate is measured for each of 7 seven time slot. 
As mentioned before, ping program was used to measure the RTT values. “ping –n 100 
GatewayIP” command is run from a laptop with Windows XP operating system. A 
hundred ping requests is sent to the server and the client waits for the reply. Average 
RTT values are learned from the ping results. Laptop is connected with an IR (Infrared) 
link to the mobile client’s internal modem. Data rate of the IR link between the mobile 
client and laptop is 916 kbps, therefore it is assumed that the IR link does not cause an 
extra delay. 
 
 
Figure 4.24 GPRS performance evaluation testbed 
 
Measured data transmission rates are given in Table 4.13 for each time slot. These 
data rates will be used to compute average traversal delays. 
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Time Slot Upload Rate (Kbps) Download Rate (Kbps) 
12 PM 10.5 18.77 
2 PM 11.2 18.96 
4 PM 10.99 10.42 
6 PM 10.92 16.3 
8 PM 11.33 19.0 
10 PM 12.59 28.68 
12 AM 12.76 28.89 
Table 4.13 Data rates for selected cases 
 
The GSM Service Provider configured the GPRS bearer using the CS-2 coding 
scheme. Therefore the theoretical data rate for one GPRS channel (time slot) is 14.4 
kbps. Nokia 7650 uses one time slot for upload and three time slots for download 
operations. So, 14.4 kbps is theoretically the maximum data rate for upload operations, 
and it is 43.2 kbps for download operations. On the other hand, the practical results 
measured for the test network are given in Table 4.13. We see that the average values of 
the data rates significantly change during the day. Especially the download data rate is 
much lower than theoretical maximum value during the busy hours of the day. 
 
The second phase is to analyze the ping RTT values. RTT for the ping request and 
reply includes the transmission of the 64 byte ping request to the server, traversal delay 
form the mobile client to the WAP gateway, transmission of the 64 byte ping reply from 
the server to the mobile client, and traversal delay from the WAP gateway to the mobile 
client. Assuming that the traversal delay is similar for both directions as stated in the 
data transmission time model in Section 3.3, we can say that the RTT value is composed 
of the download and upload time for the 64 byte ping request/reply, and two times the 
traversal delay.  
 
Measured RTT values for each time slot are given in Figure 4.25 through Figure 
4.31 correspondingly. 
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Figure 4.25 RTT values measured at 12 PM (average = 761.8 ms) 
 
 
Figure 4.26 RTT values measured at 2 PM (average = 737.3 ms) 
 
 
Figure 4.27 RTT values measured at 4 PM (average = 805.9 ms) 
 
 
Figure 4.28 RTT values measured at 6 PM (average = 778.9 ms) 
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Figure 4.29 RTT values measured at 8 PM (average = 805.9 ms) 
 
 
Figure 4.30 RTT values measured at 10 PM (average = 743.1 ms) 
 
 
Figure 4.31 RTT values measured at 12 AM (average = 710.1 ms) 
 
 
We compute the traversal delay by using Eq. ( 4.2 ). 
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( 4.2 ) 
 
Where; 
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traversalT  :  One-way traversal delay of the GPRS network 
RTTT  :  Ping RTT value (average value for the considered time slot) 
downloadR  :  Data rate from the server to the client 
uploadR  :  Data rate from the client to the server 
 
Eq. ( 4.2 ) has been implemented in Matlab 6.0 and using the data rate information 
given in Table 4.13, traversal delays have been plotted for each case in Figure 4.32 
through Figure 4.38. 
 
Traversal delay characteristics for each time slot are summarized in Table 4.14. 
We see that the average value for the traversal delay is between approximately 350 ms 
to 400 ms for the selected test cases. It is important to remark that (i) the standard 
deviation of the traversal delay is significantly high and, (ii) it is always possible to face 
with high traversal delays throughout the day. 
 
Time Slot Traversal Delay Mean 
Value (ms) 
Traversal Delay Standard 
Deviation (ms) 
12 PM 376.1 141.2 
2 PM 364.1 115.8 
4 PM 397.0 213.9 
6 PM 384.5 175.7 
8 PM 398.4 213.9 
10 PM 367.9 151.4 
12 AM 351.4 120.1 
Table 4.14 Traversal delay characteristics for test cases 
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Figure 4.32 Traversal Delays measured at 12 PM (average = 376.1 ms) 
 
 
Figure 4.33 Traversal Delays measured at 2 PM (average = 364.1 ms) 
 
 
Figure 4.34 Traversal Delays measured at 4 PM (average = 397.0 ms) 
 
 
Figure 4.35 Traversal Delays measured at 6 PM (average = 384.5 ms) 
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Figure 4.36 Traversal Delays measured at 8 PM (average = 398.4 ms) 
 
 
Figure 4.37 Traversal Delays measured at 10 PM (average = 367.9 ms) 
 
 
Figure 4.38 Traversal Delays measured at 12 AM (average = 351.4 ms) 
 
 
4.3.3. Comparison of GSM CSD and GPRS Data Transmission Times 
 
GPRS is generally known to be a superior to GSM CSD bearer when comparing 
the data rates and pricing. Indeed, GPRS data rates are higher than GSM CSD. However, 
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this data rate advantage can not be realized for the WTLS handshake protocol. This is 
because of the high valued network traversal delay for both GSM CSD and GPRS 
bearers. High data rates become an advantage when downloading higher data sizes but 
there is only a slight change in the data transmission time for WTLS handshake protocol 
due to the small sized handshake messages. Traversal delays for both bearer types are 
compared in Table 4.15. 
 
Bearer Traversal Delay 
Mean Value (ms) 
Traversal Delay Standard 
Deviation (ms) 
GSM CSD 391.3 90.0 
GPRS (worst case) 398.4 213.9 
GPRS (average case) 376.1 141.2 
GPRS (best case) 351.4 120.1 
Table 4.15 Comparison of traversal delays for GSM CSD and GPRS bearers 
 
Network traversal delay values are similar for both data bearer types. Data 
transmission time is significantly determined by this high valued network specific delay 
rather than the data rate of the bearer. Therefore, decreasing the number of round trips is 
much more effective on the data transmission time. Therefore, it is possible to minimize 
the number of round trips by combining the consecutive handshake messages where it is 
appropriate. The WTLS standard [5] implies that the server handshake messages 
starting from the server hello message to the server hello done message can be 
combined in one lower layer message. Retrieving the client certificate from an external 
certificate store instead of the client itself also decrease the number of round trips over 
the GSM network between the client and the server. 
 
4.4. Overall Handshake Time Analysis 
 
WTLS handshake protocol overall handshake time was modeled considering three 
main factors, which were: 
 
i. Client and server processing times 
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ii. Data transmission time over the channel 
iii. Server queue delay 
 
All of the factors given above have been analyzed separately in the previous 
sections. On the other hand, our aim is to discover the bottlenecks that occur during the 
WTLS handshake protocol. Therefore, we need to analyze all this factors together to 
decide on what constitutes a bottleneck for the protocol. Three different groups of 
figures will be analyzed in this section. The first group of figures Figure 4.39, Figure 
4.40 and Figure 4.41 give the overall processing times for category#1, category#2 and 
category#3 key exchange suites for GSM CSD bearer. There is no server load in these 
figures and the server is busy with only one handshake operation.  It is possible to 
analyze two main factors of the WTLS handshake protocol performance from these 
figures, namely the processing times and data transmission times. Overall handshake 
times for measured best case, worst case, average case GPRS and GSM CSD bearer are 
compared in Figure 4.42 and Figure 4.43. 
 
Queue delay affects on the overall handshake time are analyzed using Figure 4.44, 
Figure 4.45 and Figure 4.46 for category#3 groups using different type of certificates 
with different level of security. 
 
Figure 4.39 shows the overall handshake times for mutual authenticated and 
server authenticated WTLS handshakes using category#1 certificates. Data transmission 
time is really a big portion of the overall handshake time for all the cases considered, 
especially for ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites. Processing time is affective on the 
overall processing time for only the mutual authenticated WTLS handshake using client 
and server certificates with 1024 bit RSA public key. Considering the data transmission 
time over the channel as the first issue discovered, it is worth to analyze the data 
transmission time in some more detail. It is interesting that the data transmission time 
varies a little although the data size for the different key exchange suites vary, 
especially it is almost doubled for the RSA key exchange suite. Data transmission time 
analysis given in Section 4.3 states that the traversal delays  of the network traversalT  
constitutes 76% of the data transmission time. 2* traversalT  is added to the overall 
handshake time regardless of the data size transmitted. Therefore, the number of 
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handshake messages have more affect on the overall handshake time instead of the data 
size and data transmission rate. It is also important that the traversal delay of the 
network traversalT  strictly depends on the data bearer used and may have greater or lower 
values for different types of data bearers. The measurements were done using GSM 
CSD as the data bearer with 9600 bps data transmission rate. Traversal delays for the 
GPRS bearer have also been predicted in Section 4.3.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.39 Category#1 WTLS handshake overall handshake times 
 
Data transmission time is still a big issue for category#2 certificates as seen in 
Figure 4.40. ECDH_ECDSA key exchange processing times are not very affective on 
the overall WTLS handshake time. Mutual authenticated handshake using group#4 
certificates (RSA1024 and RSA2048) have processing times that constitute the biggest 
portion of the handshake time. 
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Figure 4.40 Category#2 WTLS handshake overall handshake times 
 
Analyzing the handshake performance when using category#3 certificates, we see 
in Figure 4.41 that the processing time is really affective on the overall handshake time 
for group#4 (RSA) certificates. This is due to the increase in the client processing times 
when generating the CertificateVerify message and other operations using RSA 
certificates. 
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Figure 4.41 Category#3 WTLS handshake overall handshake times 
 
Network traversal delays for the GPRS bearer has been computed in Section 4.3.2. 
Mutual authenticated WTLS full handshake and server authenticated WTLS full 
handshake overall times have been computed by using the network traversal delay 
values given in Table 4.15 and compared in Figure 4.42 and Figure 4.43 respectively.  
Although there is a significant data rate difference between GSM CSD and GPRS 
bearers, we see that the overall handshake time is not very different for these bearers 
because of the similar network traversal delay characteristics. 
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Figure 4.42 Mutual authenticated WTLS handshake overall times for GSM CSD and GPRS 
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Figure 4.43 Server authenticated WTL handshake overall times for GSM CSD and GPRS 
 
First part of the overall handshake time analysis investigates the affects of the 
processing times and data transmission times on the overall handshake time. It is clearly 
seen that the data transmission time has the biggest affect on all of the ECDH_ECDSA 
key exchange suites using category#1, category#2 and category#3 certificates and RSA 
key exchange suites using category#1 and category#2 certificates when performing 
server authenticated WTLS handshake for both GSM CSD and GPRS data bearer types. 
Mutual authentication using RSA certificates and server authentication using 
category#3 RSA certificates has the processing time as the biggest portion of the overall 
handshake time. 
 
Data transmission time is not always the bottleneck for the WTLS handshake 
protocol although it has the biggest portion of the overall handshake time for our tests 
over GSM CSD bearer. Due to the high valued traversal delays for both GSM CSD and 
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GPRS bearers, number of round trips is the most important parameter that significantly 
affects the data transmission time. 
 
Although the processing times are really small for especially ECDH_ECDSA key 
exchange suites, the average server processing times for each handshake message are 
very important when considering the server queue delay. Here begins the second part of 
the overall handshake time analysis to investigate the affects of the average waiting time 
in the server queue. WTLS handshake protocol queue delay performance has been 
analyzed for category#3 certificates. Three cases analyzed below are the members of the 
groups that offer different levels of security. 
 
Figure 4.44 gives the overall handshake times for varying values of mutual 
authenticated full handshake requests per second between 0 and 100. Categories and 
corresponding groups have been defined in Table 3.3. We see that ECDH_ECDSA key 
exchange suites using 160 bit prime curves have a good queue delay characteristic. On 
the other hand, ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites using 163 bit Koblitz, 163 bit 
random curves and RSA key exchange suite using RSA 1024 has an upper limit of 
approximately 70 handshake requests per second. This bottleneck is due to the server 
processing times of the corresponding key exchange suites. 
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Figure 4.44 Mutual authenticated handshake times with queue delay-1 (category#3) 
 
ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites’ server queue delay characteristic s do not 
change very much as the certificate security strength is increased. Figure 4.45 shows the 
queue delay affects on the overall handshake time for the mutual authenticated WTLS 
full handshake when using certificates with 224 bit prime curve, 233 bit Koblitz curve, 
233 bit random curve parameters and RSA certificate with 2048 bit public key. 224 bit 
prime curve certificates again have best queue delay performance, 233 bit Koblitz curve 
certificates have an upper limit of 80 handshake requests per second, where 233 bit  
random curve certificates can server 75 handshake requests per second with an 
acceptable queue delay. Therefore, we see the significant change in the overall 
handshake time for the RSA key exchange using certificates with 2048 bit RSA public 
key. The queue delay asymptotically increases after 20 handshake requests per second 
when 2048 bit RSA certificates are used. 
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Figure 4.45 Mutual authenticated handshake times with queue delay-2 (category#3) 
 
Mutual authenticated WTLS handshake using RSA certificates with 3072 bit 
public key has a terrible queue delay performance that the overall handshake time is not 
acceptable even for two handshake requests per second. ECDH_ECDSA key exchange 
suites using certificates with 256 bit prime curve, 283 bit Koblitz curve and 283 bit 
random curve have similar queue delay characteristics as analyzed previously. Mutual 
authenticated WTLS handshake times are given in Figure 4.46 for these types of 
systems. 
 
121 
 
Figure 4.46 Mutual authenticated handshake times with queue delay-3 (category#3) 
 
Server queue delay affects on the mutual authenticated WTLS handshake times 
have been analyzed up to here. Server authenticated WTLS handshake performance is 
not that bounded by the server queue delays as it is the case for the mutual authenticated 
WTLS handshake excluding the server authenticated WTLS handshake using RSA 
certificates. Average server queue waiting time for the use of RSA key exchange suites 
during server authenticated WTLS handshake was analyzed in Section 4.2 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
WTLS (Wireless Transport Layer Security) [5] is the security protocol that was 
designed to add valuable security services to WAP [1] sessions. WTLS has two main 
sub-protocols, namely the Record Protocol and the Handshake Protocol. Handshake 
protocol is responsible to provide security parameters to the Record Protocol by 
negotiating on the premaster secret, key refresh period, etc. between the peers. In this 
thesis WTLS Handshake Protocol performance is evaluated by modeling the different 
components of the protocol and by analyzing the implementation results parallel to the 
performance model.  The performance model considers three main components that may 
cause bottleneck for the protocol. These are client and server processing times, server 
queue waiting time and handshake data transmission time over the channel. 
 
WTLS Handshake Protocol [5] and necessary crypto primitives have been 
implemented in C++ and the protocol performance has been measured for different 
cryptosystems. Four different types of certificates have been used during the tests. 
These are RSA certificates with 1024, 2048 and 3072 bit key sizes and three types of 
ECC certificates. Three ECC curve types are prime, Koblitz and random curves. 160 bit, 
224 bit, and 256 bit prime curves, 163 bit, 233 bit, and 283 bit Koblitz and random 
curves have been used. 256 bit prime curve, 283 bit Koblitz curve, and 283 bit random 
curve are not offered by the WTLS standard, these are the stronger ones that provide the 
level of security needed for today’s WAP applications. 160/163 bit ECC curves offer 
the same level of security with 1024 bit RSA certificates. Similarly, 224/233 bit ECC 
curves are equivalent to 2048 bit RSA and 256/283 bit ECC certificates offer the same 
level of security with 3072 bit RSA certificates. 
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Three categories have been considered during the tests. The first category includes 
four groups of server/client WTLS certificates with 160 bit prime, 163 bit Koblitz, 163 
bit random curve parameters and 1024 bit RSA public key.  Certification authority (CA) 
certificate also has the same key size and public key type. The second category comes 
with an upgrade of security level. CA certificates in the second category have 224 bit 
prime, 233 bit Koblitz, 233 bit random curve parameters and 2048 bit RSA public key 
appropriately with the client/server certificate public key type. Client/server WTLS 
certificates in this category offer two different level of security, these are 160/224 bit 
prime curve, 163/233 bit Koblitz and random curve, 1024/2048 bit RSA. The third 
category has the top level of security that is offered by this thesis, also not offered by 
the WTLS standard [5]. CA certificates have 256 bit prime, 283 bit Koblitz, 283 bit 
random curve parameters or 3072 bit RSA public key. All of the three possible key 
sizes are used for server/client WTLS certificates. These are 160/224/256 bit prime, 
163/233/283 bit Koblitz, 163/233/283 bit random ECC curves and 1024/2048/3072 bit 
RSA. Totally 48 test cases have been considered, 24 is for mutual authenticated WTLS 
full handshake and the remaining 24 is for server authenticated WTLS full handshake. 4 
of 24 test cases (certificates) come from category#1 while 8 is from category#2 and 12 
is from category#3 certificates. 
 
Simulation results show that ECC curves perform better than the RSA 
cryptosystems in WTLS Handshake Protocol. This is an obvious result. Therefore, 
processing time effects on the WTLS handshake operation will be much more valuable. 
1024 bit RSA has somewhat comparable processing time with its rival ECC ones at the 
client side but it is not possible to say the same thing for the server side. ECC curves’ 
server processing times are significantly lower than RSA server processing times. In 
addition to that, ECC curves also have different processing time performance. Prime 
curves are always faster than Koblitz and random curves at the server side. Koblitz 
curves are the second but random curve processing times are generally similar to the 
Koblitz curves at the server side. Mutual authenticated WTLS handshake using 
category#1 certificates with 160 bit prime curve parameters has a server processing time 
of 10.57 ms, where it is 24.48 ms for 163 bit Koblitz curve, 24.01 ms for 163 bit 
random curve and 45.86 ms for 1024 bit RSA. Server processing times for both mutual 
authenticated and server authenticated WTLS handshake using WTLS certificates with 
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prime curve parameters are always lower than half of the Koblitz and random curve 
server processing times.  
 
The level of security that a certificate offers may be increased by upgrading the 
issuer CA certificate to a larger key size. This is achieved by the three categories 
considered during the performance evaluation. We see that the server authenticated 
WTLS handshake server processing time slightly increases for ECC and RSA 
certificates, in the case of signing the certificate with a stronger key size. For example, 
server authenticated WTLS full handshake using category#1(to be verified with 1024 
bit RSA) 1024 bit RSA certificate has a server processing time of 36.99 ms, where it is 
37.80 ms for category#2(to be verified with 2048 bit RSA), and 38.37 ms for 
category#3(to be verified with 3072 bit RSA). However, client processing time 
significantly increases as the CA certificate is upgraded to a stronger key size. It is the 
same case for both client and server when performing mutual authenticated WTLS 
handshake.  
 
It is also an interesting result that the prime curves have the worst processing time 
performance for the client side, where Koblitz and random curves perform similarly.  
Mutual authenticated WTLS full handshake using category#1 160 bit prime curves have 
a client processing time of 745.65 ms, where it is 502.74 ms and 489.01 ms for 163 bit 
Koblitz and random curves respectively.  Due to the low processing power of the client, 
handshake processing time at the client side is extremely higher than the server 
processing times. 
 
As an expected result, both client and server processing times increase as the key 
size increases for the same public key cryptosystem. However, increase in the 
processing time is much more significant for RSA key exchange suites. Implementation 
results show that the server processing time increases from 38.37 ms to 871.41 ms when 
using 3072 bit RSA certificates instead of 1024 bit RSA certificates. Therefore, it goes 
up to 26.67 ms for 283 bit random curve while 163 bit random curve processing time is 
8.41 ms. We see that increasing the security level has a significant effect on the overall 
handshake processing time for RSA key exchange suites, where the increase is tolerable 
for ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites. 
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When mutual authenticated handshake is performed instead of server 
authenticated handshake, increase in the client processing time is negligible for 
ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites. On the other hand, there is a significant increase 
in the client processing time for the RSA key exchange suites. This is why the mutual 
authenticated ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites do not require an extra operation 
except sending the client certificate to the server, where the RSA key exchange suites 
require performing a private key operation to generate the CertificateVerify message. 
Client processing time is measured as 738.95 ms for server authenticated WTLS 
handshake using category#1 160 bit prime curves, where it is 745.65 ms for the mutual 
authenticated WTLS handshake. Client processing time goes up to 3780.4 ms for 
mutual authenticated WTLS handshake using category#1 1024 bit RSA certificates, 
where it is 1006.78 ms for server authenticated WTLS handshake using the same RSA 
certificate type.  In contrast to the client side, server processing time is always grater for 
mutual authenticated WTLS handshake. 
 
 Using 256 bit prime, 283 bit Koblitz, and 283 bit random ECC curves seems 
feasible, where 2048 bit and 3072 bit RSA should not be used in WTLS Handshake 
Protocol for their extremely high processing times at both client and server side. 
 
Implementation results show that server queue delay is a source of bottleneck for 
the WTLS handshake operation, whereas it does not look like a problem to consider for 
some cases. Average waiting time in the server queue is negligible when using 
ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites for server authenticated WTLS handshake. This is 
due to the low processing times of ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites’ handshake 
messages. On the other hand, server queue delay must be considered when using RSA 
certificates for server authenticated WTLS handshake. Maximum number of server 
authenticated handshake requests per second is only 6 when using category#3 3072 bit 
RSA certificates. 21 server authenticated WTLS handshake requests can be served with 
an average waiting time of 1500 ms, when using category#3 2048 bit RSA certificates. 
1024 bit RSA certificates have somewhat acceptable queue delay characteristics for 
server authenticated WTLS handshake. 
 
When performing mutual authenticated WTLS handshake, ECDH_ECDSA key 
exchange with prime curves has a good queue delay characteristic due to the low 
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processing times at the server side. Koblitz and random curves have a practical upper 
limit for the number of mutual authenticated WTLS handshake as well as the RSA 
certificates. An interesting result is that, average waiting time in the server queue 
changes slightly as the larger key sizes are used for Koblitz and random curves, where it 
dramatically gets worse as the RSA key size increases. This is due to the fact that server 
processing time does not increase very much for mutual authenticated WTLS handshake 
as larger key sizes are used for ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suites. Therefore, RSA 
key exchange suites’ server processing times are highly vulnerable to increase in key 
sizes.  
 
Server queue waiting time strictly depends on the average server processing times 
of the individual handshake messages. Therefore, an improvement is possible by using 
state-of-the-art implementation of the crypto primitives or upgrading the server 
processing power. 
 
Handshake data transmission time is an important concern for the overall 
handshake time. It is obvious that the data transmission time depends on the 
transmission rate of the data bearer used. However, another characteristic to cons ider is 
the traversal delay of the network. This delay is added to the RTT (Round Trip Time) 
regardless of the data size sent. Measurements show that the traversal delay of the 
network is much more significant on the transmission time then the data transmission 
rate for both GSM CSD and GPRS data bearer types. There is no significant difference 
between the data transmission time over GSM CSD and GPRS for small data sizes. This 
is due to the similar traversal delay characteristics for both carrier systems. Therefore, 
the number of handshake messages becomes the most important parameter that affects 
the WTLS handshake data transmission time. 
 
Comparing the obtained results with the similar research on the subject studied by 
Levi and Savas in [30], we see differences at ECC curves processing time performance. 
Prime curves are the best curve option for both client and server side according to their 
results. Similarly, prime curves have been found as the best option for the server side in 
this thesis. However, prime curves have the worst processing time performance at the 
client side. Koblitz curves are the second and random curves always have the worst 
performance in [30]. There is also a conflict of performance for Koblitz and random 
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curves when compared to results in this thesis. These differences are most probably due 
to the state-of-the-art implementation in [30]. Both studies have a common result that, 
prime curves are the best option to use at the server side whether it is state-of-the-art 
implementation or not. This is also an important result when considering the queue 
delay performance of an ECDH_ECDSA key exchange suite. Transmission time effects 
on the overall handshake time are also different from the results in [30]. There are two 
main reasons for this difference. First of all, overall handshake data sizes are not the 
same. Only the certificates sizes and other public key related data sizes are considered 
in [30] where, all of the handshake messages and their corresponding ACK packets are 
considered in this thesis. The second and more important difference between the two 
transmission time models is the consideration of network specific traversal delay.  
Traversal delay significantly affects the overall data transmission time as stated in this 
thesis. 
 
Performing the tests over a real GSM service provider network comes with the 
advantages of reflecting the network specific operational costs and message parsing 
costs to the overall handshake time. Queue delay was not considered only as an extra 
cost to the handshake time with an assumed arrival rate. Instead, an upper limit for the 
handshake requests per second has been obtained for each 48 test cases and realized that 
queue delay is not always a concern for the available key exchange suites. Another 
contribution is that, the data transmission time can not be modeled by only considering 
the data transmission rate of the channel.  The most striking result of the simulations is 
that, the effects of the network specific traversal delay rules the data transmission time 
for both GSM CSD and GPRS bearers. It has been realized that the number of 
handshake messages is much more important for the overall data transmission time 
because of the traversal delay that is added to the WSP packet Round Trip Time 
regardless of the data size sent. So, measured data transmission times for all the key 
exchange suites are almost equal due to the high valued traversal delay of the test 
network for GSM CSD bearer. Therefore, this comes with the requirement of specifying 
the average traversal delay of the network to predict the transmission time for a specific 
data bearer type. 
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